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Abstract 
The 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security 
Space Management and Organization recommended that U.S. efforts in national security 
space be elevated to the highest national security priority.  With more focused high-level 
attention on national security space decisions, a measure that captures and quantifies the 
value of space capabilities to combat operations professionals is desired.  This thesis 
models what the air warriors desire from space assets in combat. 
A Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) approach was used to elicit values from air 
combat experts with operational experience.  An initial Gold Standard value model was 
constructed and validated by air combat experts with recent experience in joint air 
operations.  The strategic objective, “Leverage National Security Space Capabilities to 
Enhance Air Combat Operations,” was decomposed into values which were structured 
into a hierarchy.  Measures and value functions were identified for the bottom-tier values, 
which were weighted locally to assess their relative importance.   
The research identified measures of merit with thresholds beneath which value at 
higher levels is eliminated, resulting in a multiplicative value function using indicator 
variables.  An additional result is the separation of communication and navigation 
measures into pre-flight and in-flight components, which has not been documented in 
previous literature. 
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THE AIR WARRIOR’S VALUE OF NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
What Does National Security Space Bring to the Air War? 
The U.S. Government employs a vast array of national and military space 
capabilities (termed national security space in this thesis) that have served, and 
continue to serve, as a force multiplier in military operations.  National security space 
gives the warfighter engaged in operations the leverage that comes from “global view” 
(SPACECAST 2020, 1994: Introduction).  This leverage, however, comes at a price.  
The Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 
Management and Organization (also known as the Space Commission Report) 
cautioned that the U.S. is uniquely dependent on national security space, and that this 
dependence results in vulnerabilities (Space Commission Report, 2001:9).  Adding to 
the price to be paid for space leverage for the warfighter is the monetary burden of 
putting systems in space, with cost being a “fundamental limitation to nearly all space 
missions” (Wertz and Larson, 1999:2). 
The advantages, vulnerabilities, and high cost of space capabilities represent 
multiple values that must be considered when making national security space decisions.  
The focus of this thesis is to uncover and model the values that air combat professionals 
hold with respect to national security space.  The approach involves capturing both the 
qualitative and quantitative contributions of space to the air war, as assessed by air 
warriors with experience in executing air combat operations.  Throughout the text of 
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this thesis the term air warrior will be used to denote the air combat professional, 
defined as the military service member who directly applies force with air assets. 
The senior Air Force leadership has recently stated that three core competencies 
remain at the heart of the Air Force’s mission. Two of these competencies, technology-
to-warfighting and integrating operations, will be nurtured by the analysis done in this 
thesis (Roche, 2003:1-2; Jumper, 2003:1-2).1  Integrating operations involves 
translating the Air Force’s “air and space power vision into decisive operational 
capability” (Jumper, 2003:2), which has been and continues to be crucial to “prevailing 
in conflict and averting technological surprise” (Roche, 2003:2).  The goal of 
integrating operations is to “envision, experiment, and ultimately, execute the union of 
a myriad of platforms and into a greater synergistic whole” in support of maximizing 
the unique capabilities that air and space power bring to the fight (Roche, 2003:2), 
resulting in the seamless integration of systems, activities, and expertise (Jumper, 
2003:2).  The goal of this thesis is to develop the air warrior’s yardstick for measuring 
how well national security space capabilities satisfy these core competencies. 
This integration of technology into warfighting requires decision makers to 
balance multiple objectives.  Value-Focused Thinking (VFT), as developed by Ralph 
Keeney and refined by Craig Kirkwood and others, is a modeling technique that has 
been frequently used to assist with both military and civilian decisions.  In this thesis 
VFT is used to identify and quantify what the users of national security space value in 
an analytical, documented, and traceable manner.  As will be shown in Chapter II, VFT 
has been applied in a broad array of military applications, and this thesis is an effort to 
                                                 
1 The other competency is “Developing Airmen” (Roche, 2003:1; Jumper 2001:1), which falls outside 
the scope of assessing the value of space from the air warrior’s point of view. 
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extend its advantages to maximize national security support to the air combat 
professional.  The resulting model not only represents the air warrior’s point of view for 
his or her own benefit, but also provides useful insights to decision makers in the 
Intelligence Community (IC), and analysts in the modeling and simulation 
communities. 
 
Setting the Decision Frame 
Setting the decision frame is a prerequisite to building a value model.  The 
decision frame consists of the fundamental objectives, which are the focus of this study, 
and the decision context, which is set beforehand by the scope of the activity being 
contemplated (Keeney, 1992:35).  There exist various decision contexts concerning the 
set of space alternatives that provide value to the air warrior, from the comprehensive 
case of all activities in space to any narrower set of space activities.  The boundary of 
the analysis of this thesis includes all Department of Defense (DOD) and Intelligence 
Community space assets, termed national security space by the Space Commission 
Report (2001:ix), but excludes civil and international programs beyond the span of 
control of the DOD and IC.  An additional boundary is set by the need to limit analysis 
to unclassified concepts and systems, although classified analysis is a possibility for the 
future. 
 
The Remainder of the Thesis Document 
Chapter II of this thesis describes VFT and its previous applications to national 
security space decisions, as well as examining the roles that values play in other space 
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decision-making methods.  Chapter III presents the methodology employed in the 
study, and Chapter IV presents the resulting model.  Chapter V summarizes the results 
of the research, and Chapter VI presents recommendations for future work in this area. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
 A review of literature pertinent to valuing national security space is important 
for several reasons.  A general overview of Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) sets the 
stage for explaining the methodology in the study.  An examination of values in other 
forms of decision making with implications for national security space highlights the 
advantages of a values-first approach.  Previous work in VFT – as it has been applied to 
national security space decisions, both at the space architecture level and at the 
architectural element level – is then summarized, along with its implications for the 
topic this thesis addresses. 
 
Literature Review — Methodology 
Value-Focused Thinking 
Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) has been used over a broad array of 
applications to develop decision-making preference models that are both qualitative and 
quantitative.  Ralph Keeney, in his text entitled Value-Focused Thinking (1992), 
explains the VFT process by contrasting it with the usual decision-making process, 
which he terms Alternative-Focused Thinking (AFT).  He describes AFT as first 
defining the problem, then identifying alternatives, and finally specifying the values by 
which the alternatives will be evaluated.  He states that identifying alternatives before 
evaluation considerations will “stifle creativity and innovation” (Keeney, 1992:48).  In 
essence, putting emphasis on alternatives can act as a restrictive influence on additional 
alternative generation, without regard to their suitability to the decision situation.  AFT 
may also obscure values not initially apparent to the decision maker (Keeney, 1992:24).   
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AFT may be likened to the admonishment “don’t just stand there, do 
something.”  A focus on alternatives may lead to a quick and easy “solution” in the 
short term, but with a price to be paid in terms of the “solution’s” consequences 
(Keeney, 1992:6).  Value-Focused Thinking (VFT), on the other hand, encourages 
stakeholders to “sit down” and take measure of their values before rushing to “do 
something” that may or may not be in accord with the true values that are relevant to 
the decision. 
VFT, in contrast to AFT, calls for identifying what is important to the decision-
maker before alternatives are considered.  Paying attention to the decision maker’s 
values first may broaden the scope of solutions beyond those that were specified by the 
initially apparent alternatives (Keeney, 1992:27), and may uncover the decision 
maker’s or decision making group’s hidden values (Keeney, 1992:24).   
Keeney further maintains that a focus on values offers several other advantages 
to decision making.  Awareness of values may help a decision maker decide which 
information will be relevant to the problem, thus avoiding the waste of collecting 
extraneous information (Keeney, 1992:24-25).  Discussion of values brings more 
stakeholders into the decision process, as values are usually stated in terms that avoid 
esoteric technical concepts (Keeney, 1992:25).  Values identification can help multiple 
stakeholders resolve conflicts by separating discussions about decision outcomes from 
discussions about the relative desirability of those outcomes by clarifying the basis for 
disagreements (Keeney, 1992:25-26).  Explicating values can ensure consistency across 
multiple decisions (Keeney, 1992:26) and thinking about values may assist us in 
creating new decision opportunities that offer chances for improving performance on 
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the decision maker’s own terms (Keeney, 1992:27).  Finally, values and their relative 
importance to the decision maker can be modeled in terms of an objective function that 
quantifies the consequences of alternatives that may be considered (Keeney, 1992:26).  
This is the primary advantage this thesis purports to lend the air warrior: a method of 
quantitatively evaluating national security space decision alternatives according to the 
values that the air warrior holds. 
Kirkwood (1997:12-13) recommends structuring a decision maker’s values in a 
hierarchy, with the decision maker’s overall strategic objective at the top, and the 
fundamental objectives that directly support the strategic objective in the first tier.  As 
value hierarchies have become commonplace in decision analysis literature, this 
literature review will pass directly to the elicitation methods.  For the interested reader a 
detailed description of value hierarchies can be found in Appendix A.  
Eliciting Value Hierarchies 
Kirkwood mentions two sources from which value hierarchies can be 
developed: relevant literature and casual empiricism (Kirkwood, 1997:21-22).  A 
review of the literature relevant to the current problem being studied may lead to 
information that is useful for developing a hierarchy, or may even uncover hierarchies 
themselves that yield insight into the current problem.2  Value hierarchies can also be 
elicited from the decision’s stakeholders themselves.  Kirkwood terms this approach 
casual empiricism (emphasis in original), and he recommends that it be done through 
structured interviews to ensure buy-in from the stakeholders and to ensure that the 
appropriate measures, value functions, and weights are included in the hierarchy 
                                                 
2 For a set of preliminary national security space value hierarchies derived from content analysis of 
doctrine, see Appendix 2. 
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(Kirkwood, 1997:21-22).  The method of this study has utilized both sources of values, 
as will be explained in Chapter III. 
The Gold Standard approach is often used to extract values hierarchies from 
relevant literature.  As used in Burk and Parnell (1997: 66) and described by Parnell, 
Conley, Jackson, Lehmkuhl, and Andrew (1998:1338), this approach entails identifying 
an authoritative policy document that describes major objectives within the decision 
context.  An adequate Gold Standard document will directly supply one or more tiers of 
the value hierarchy from the objectives described within.  The remainder of the 
hierarchy can be developed by individuals who have the expertise necessary to render 
adequate judgments that concern the decision at hand.   
When time available with subject matter experts is limited, analysis of an 
authoritative Gold Standard document can provide a starting point for a value 
hierarchy.  Extracting objectives from a Gold Standard document (e.g., doctrine) may 
be done directly as in SPACECAST 2020 (Burk and Parnell, 1997:66), or may be 
accomplished through a systematic analysis if there is enough lead-time before the 
casual empiricism process begins.  Appendix B describes such an approach that was 
accomplished in strategic preparation for this thesis in which implicit organizational 
objectives for national security space were identified in addition to the explicit 
capability-based objectives. 
The Silver Standard approach (Parnell et al., 1998:1340) is often used where no 
Gold Standard document exists.  This approach entails structuring a hierarchy from the 
bottom up by identifying the objectives at the lowest tier.  For example, in Foundations 
2025, the value model developed for the Air Force 2025 study, bottom-tier objectives 
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were identified using verbs to describe basic tasks that became bottom-level objectives.  
The verbs were then structured into sub-objectives, objectives, and fundamental 
objectives by the use of affinity diagrams, with the overarching strategic objective 
taken from the original charge given to the Air Force 2025 participants (“achieve air 
and space dominance”) (Parnell et al., 1998:1340). 
The Platinum Standard, as developed by Parnell, Bennett, Engelbrecht, and 
Szafranski (2002:82-83) uses information from both Gold Standard documents and 
structured interviews with senior decision makers and stakeholders whose schedules do 
not allow the time required to meet and discuss all of the bottom-level objectives 
needed to form the lowest tier of the hierarchy.  In their study of NRO Operational 
Support Office (OSO) resource allocation, Parnell et al. (2002) used information from 
23 structured interviews from within the OSO and from other NRO organizations to list 
the future activities that would provide the most value to the NRO and its customers.  
They then used affinity diagrams to group the activities into functions, from which the 
strategic objective3 and fundamental objectives4 for the hierarchy were identified, with 
the help of the Gold Standard documents and the interviews.  Weights were elicited 
beginning with the lowest level and proceeding upward by means of a survey of 23 
OSO personnel (Parnell et al., 2002:85). 
The Decision Frame 
Keeney (1992:30) points out that a decision is framed by the decision context 
and the fundamental objectives.  The values of concern in a given decision situation are 
                                                 
3 Parnell et al. (2002) use the term “fundamental objective” to describe what is termed “strategic 
objective” in the remainder of this thesis.  To retain consistency, the term “strategic objective” will be 
used. 
4 Parnell et al. (2002) use the term “objective” to mean what the term “fundamental objective” means in 
the remainder of this thesis.   
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made explicit by objectives (Keeney, 1992:55) which are categorized into fundamental 
objectives and means objectives (Keeney, 1992:34-35).  Fundamental objectives 
“characterize the essential reasons for interest” in a given decision situation, while 
means objectives are “means to the achievement of the fundamental objectives.”  
Fundamental objectives can be identified by asking, “Why Is This Important?” 
(Keeney, 1992:66) (also known as the WITI test).   Applying the WITI test to an 
objective will lead to one of two responses: either the objective is important because it 
supports the achievement of another objective, or it is simply important in its own right 
(Keeney, 1992:78).  The first response indicates that the objective is a means objective 
that supports another objective (which may or may not be a fundamental objective) 
while the second response indicates that a fundamental objective has likely been found 
(Keeney, 1992:66). 
Comparing VFT With a Space Systems Engineering Approach 
Wertz and Larson address values and objective structuring in their text entitled 
Space Mission Analysis and Design (Wertz and Larson, 1999:12-13).  Although they 
limit their discussion of values to the space mission design framework, an examination 
of where values enter into the process is instructive.  Their process, which has “evolved 
over the first 40 years of space exploration,” (Wertz and Larson, 1999:1) consists of the 
steps listed in Table 1: 
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Table 1.  The Space Mission Design and Analysis Process. 
Define 
Objectives 
Step 1. 
Step 2. 
Define broad objectives and constraints. 
Estimate quantitative mission needs and 
constraints. 
Characterize 
the Mission 
Step 3. 
Step 4. 
Step 5. 
Step 6. 
Define alternative mission concepts. 
Define alternative mission architectures. 
Identify system drivers for each. 
Characterize mission concepts and architectures. 
Evaluate the 
Mission 
Step 7. 
Step 8. 
Step 9. 
Identify critical requirements. 
Evaluate mission utility. 
Define mission concept (baseline). 
Define 
Requirements 
Step 10. 
Step 11. 
Define system requirements. 
Allocate system requirements to elements. 
Wertz and Larson, 1999:2. 
 
The decision maker in space mission analysis and design (SMAD) can be the 
sponsor, designer, end user, and/or the developer (Wertz and Larson, 1999:7).  The 
SMAD process starts with the decision maker’s values by qualitatively identifying 
primary and secondary objectives at Step 1.  Instead of subdividing the main objective 
into supporting objectives, however, in Step 2 they focus attention on defining 
quantitative measures and thresholds that will meet the objectives.  Both Steps 1 and 2 
require implicit value judgments to be made in determining what the objectives are and 
what numerical measures of performance are required to meet the objectives.  Value 
judgments are also made when deciding which objective is primary and which ones are 
secondary.  
Generation of alternatives begins early in the process at Steps 3 and 4.  System 
drivers, which are the parameters that have the most impact on system design and cost 
(Wertz and Larson, 1999:4), are identified at Step 5.  These parameters, the 
independent variables that control overall system performance, cost, and design (Wertz 
and Larson, 1999:4) are akin to the attributes in a value hierarchy, as they are the inputs 
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into the functions that will be used for evaluation.  In Step 5, then, the focus shifts back 
to values, as identifying the parameters that have the most impact on system design and 
performance requires value judgment (emphasis added).  Step 6 embraces both 
alternatives and values by defining “in detail what the system is” (which corresponds to 
alternatives) and “does” (which corresponds to values) (Wertz and Larson, 1999:4).  
Values are the focus at Step 7, with judgments made as to which requirements are 
critical and which ones are not.  Evaluation of alternatives occurs at Step 8, with 
evaluation of the goodness of the critical performance measures left to the system user 
or developer (Wertz and Larson, 1999:5).  Step 9 is the selection of one or more 
alternative baseline system designs, and becomes the starting point for the iterative 
trade process (Wertz and Larson, 1999:5).  This returns the focus to alternatives.  Step 
10 again requires implicit value judgments, as it “translates the broad objectives and 
constraints of the mission into well-defined system requirements” (Wertz and Larson, 
1999:5).  Values are key at Step 11, the allocation of requirements to the specific 
elements of the space mission (Wertz and Larson, 1999:5).  A key feature in the entire 
11-step process is successive iteration through all 11 steps until the requirements are 
met (Wertz and Larson, 1999:2).  This allows both values and alternatives to be 
adjusted according to the decision maker’s preferences.  The oscillating focus between 
values and alternatives, as assessed by this author, is shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2.  Focus of Attention at Each Step of the Space Mission Design and 
Analysis Process. 
   Focus of 
Attention 
Step 1. Define broad objectives and 
constraints. 
Values Define Objectives 
Step 2. Estimate quantitative mission needs 
and constraints. 
Values 
Step 3. Define alternative mission 
concepts. 
Alternatives 
Step 4. Define alternative mission 
architectures. 
Alternatives 
Step 5. Identify system drivers for each. Values 
Characterize the 
Mission 
Step 6. Characterize mission concepts and 
architectures 
Alternatives/
Values 
Step 7. Identify critical requirements. Values 
Step 8. Evaluate mission utility. Values 
Evaluate the 
Mission 
Step 9. Define mission concept (baseline). Alternatives 
Step 10. Define system requirements. Values Define 
Requirements Step 11. Allocate system requirements to 
elements. 
Values 
Modified from Wertz and Larson, 1999:2. 
 
Keeney’s approach focuses on values in a different manner.  First, the situation 
should be assessed as a decision problem, which “usually occurs as a result of actions 
that are not controlled by the decision maker” (Keeney, 1992:48) or a decision 
opportunity, which is “identified and defined by the decision maker” (Keeney, 
1992:50).  Although space mission designs have been precipitated by external events in 
the past (e.g., Sputnik, the Challenger accident), most current national security space 
missions represent opportunities to improve on existing capabilities (e.g., GPS III 
follows GPS II, SBIRS improves on DSP).  Keeney’s framework would thus categorize 
most space missions as decision opportunities (Keeney, 1992:50). 
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The process for addressing decision opportunities depends on whether strategic 
objectives have been specified or not.  As the SMAD process calls for defining broad 
objectives in Step 1, it is assumed that strategic objectives have not been specified.  The 
VFT sequence of activities for decision opportunities where strategic objectives have 
not been specified are as follows (Keeney, 1992:49): 
 1.  Identify a decision opportunity. 
 2.  Specify values. 
 3.  Create alternatives. 
 4.  Evaluate alternatives. 
 5.  Select an alternative. 
 
Value judgments are apparent in the first two activities, implicitly in the first case and 
explicitly in the second.  From there values set the stage for generation and 
consideration of alternatives. 
Interestingly, Wertz and Larson discount the value of having one overarching 
strategic objective that subsumes and links a set of fundamental objectives.  The 
following statement deems two of the objectives from their notional FireSat system 
incompatible: 
…we recommend strongly against numerical formulas that try to “score” how 
well a mission meets its objectives.  We can compute probabilities for achieving 
some technical objectives, but trying to numerically combine the coverage 
characteristics of different FireSat constellations with the political impact of 
launching FireSat is too simplistic for effective decision making.  Instead, we 
must identify objectives separately so we can judge how to balance alternative 
objectives and mission concepts (Wertz and Larson, 1999:13). 
 
A value-focused analysis would address this apparent incompatibility by using proxy 
attributes where directly measurable attributes are not apparent.  These are measures 
that indirectly assess the achievement of one objective by directly measuring the 
achievement of an associated objective (Keeney, 1992:103; Kirkwood, 1997:24).  In 
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the FireSat example, the decision maker would be asked to examine his/her/their values 
to determine how much coverage characteristics are worth in comparison to political 
impact.  Should political impact prove to be unquantifiable or immeasurable, an 
attribute may be identified that captures the political impact of launching a satellite (for 
example, this proxy attribute could be the number of diplomatic notes received from a 
particular government that mention the launch in a positive or negative manner).  These 
values would then be weighted in the hierarchy according to the decision maker’s 
preferences. 
Keeney also addresses oscillation between AFT and VFT before strategic 
objectives have been specified: 
Before specifying strategic objectives, a decision maker may use alternative-
focused thinking in one decision situation and use value focused thinking in 
another decision situation.  It is perhaps a bit schizophrenic, but one can jump 
back and forth from one approach to another on different “problems” (quotes in 
original).  But after the decision maker does the deep thinking necessary to 
identify and structure strategic objectives and spends the time to understand the 
guiding significance of these objectives for decision making, the decision maker 
should naturally use value-focused thinking in all decision situations.  The 
decision maker will now view the world “through value-focused glasses” 
(quotes in original) (Keeney 1992:51). 
 
Recall that SMAD requires iteration of the whole 11-step process (Wertz and Larson, 
1999:2).  In his framework Keeney does allow oscillation between alternatives and 
values in order to specify strategic objectives (Steps 1 and 2 of SMAD), but once they 
have been specified, he recommends that VFT be used to complete the process.  
Keeney’s contribution to SMAD would be to have the decision maker firmly define 
objectives at Steps 1 and 2, and relate them to each other in a hierarchical fashion.  This 
should shorten the time spent on values at later points in the 11-step process, especially 
at Steps 7 and 8 where the meaning of “critical” will have been firmly established, 
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quantified, and documented through value elicitation.  With rigorous identification of 
and definition of values at the outset, Steps 1 and 2 may be omitted in succeeding 
iterations of the SMAD process. 
Another point of contrast between SMAD and VFT is their respective treatment 
of unstated objectives.  Wertz and Larson (1999:12) acknowledge that “nearly all space 
missions have a hidden agenda which consists of secondary, typically nontechnical 
objectives” (italics in original) that are “equally important to satisfy” (Wertz and 
Larson 1999:12).  Although Wertz and Larson state that secondary and nontechnical 
objectives must be identified (Wertz and Larson 1999:13), they prescribe no method for 
uncovering them.  In contrast, Keeney (1992:24) holds that the conscious values 
uncovered by VFT “may also provide many keys to identify previously subconscious 
values by “specifying attributes and quantifying values” (Keeney, 1992:158). 
Comparing VFT With a Net Assessment Approach 
Barry D. Watts applies net assessment in his diagnostic approach to valuing the 
military use of space.  Citing his conversation with Andrew Marshall, the Pentagon’s 
Director of Net Assessment, he describes net assessment as “a discipline or art that 
relies, above all else, on genuine understanding of the enterprise or business involved 
rather than sophisticated models, complex systems, and abstract theory” (Watts, 
2001:5).  From his empirical (as opposed to prescriptive) perspective, he states “For the 
United States, the military value of orbital systems rests almost exclusively in force 
enhancement rather than force application” (Watts, 2001:12), citing several examples 
from the Persian Gulf War to support his view. 
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Watts admits more than once that his approach is not prescriptive, but 
diagnostic (Watts, 2001:5,107), and herein lies the most striking difference between his 
net assessment and VFT. Although Watts provides an evaluation of the U.S. military 
use of space, his approach merely examines current alternatives that have been 
implemented, and does not prescribe any approach to determine how the U.S. should 
assess the military value of space.  An approach to this problem applying VFT, in 
contrast, would be prescriptive in nature (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:vii), as it would 
postpone consideration of alternatives until the values by which the assessment should 
be made have been identified and modeled. 
 
Literature Review — Applications to Decisions Affecting Space Architectures  
To date there are few models used to assess the value of national security space 
capabilities with representation of the warfighter’s perspective.  Perhaps the best-
known space value model is SPACECAST 2020, a 1994 study directed by the Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) to “identify and conceptually develop high-leverage 
space technologies and systems that will best support the warfighter in the twenty-first 
century” (SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis, 1994:1).  This study used the 
judgments of students and faculty from the Air Force Institute of Technology, the 
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, the Air War College, and the Air Command and 
Staff College to develop a value model to score space systems in pursuit of the CSAF’s 
directive.  While some of the participants were combat experts, not all of them had 
been directly responsible for force application, and this may have had the effect of 
mitigating the air warrior’s direct input into the value model.  The scope of the model 
thus included more than just the air warrior’s perspective.  Additionally, the 
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SPACECAST 2020 team was tasked with developing a value model only for ranking 
and scoring technologies and systems.  Excluded from the study were concepts that did 
not concern non-technical considerations such as organization, policy, and education.  
The execution of the model was limited to a series of white papers developed in the 
course of the SPACECAST 2020 study, each presenting a space system and its 
enabling technology with the promise of a high return on investment to the Air Force.   
In 1995-96 the Air Force 2025 study was undertaken in an attempt to “generate 
ideas and concepts on the capabilities the United States will require to dominate air and 
space forces in the future” (AF 2025 Operational Analysis, 1996:Chapter 1).  A value 
model emerged from the 2025 study that was used to evaluate systems and technology 
concepts that hold great promise for future Air Force application.  As with its 
predecessor SPACECAST 2020, the participants in the study were students and faculty 
from the Air War College, the Air Command and Staff College, the Air Force Institute 
of Technology, and civilian consultants.  Although the air warrior’s perspective was 
represented in this group, it was mixed with a broader set of perspectives intended to 
give the fullest evaluation possible of air and space capabilities.  As with SPACECAST 
2020, AF 2025 was centered on technology and systems concepts, but it was not 
intended to measure the value of other concepts.  Another limiting factor for this 
research effort is the breadth of the AF 2025 approach.  The intent of AF 2025, as 
stated above, was to evaluate all systems and concepts relevant to the Air Force, and 
was not solely focused on the value of national security space capabilities.  Although 
valuable general insights emerged from AF 2025, it does not present a pure air warrior 
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perspective, nor does it allow a focused assessment of the value of national security 
space. 
Daehnick (1999:103-181) elaborates on one of the main dichotomies brought 
forth in SPACECAST 2020 (1994:5): that of command orientation and demand 
orientation.  He notes that the terms have traditionally been used to describe 
information flow in a system, but that they can be applied to every part of a space 
architecture (Daehnick, 1999:163n2).  He describes the current space architecture as 
command-oriented: “centralized, driven by specific performance requirements and 
employing a push approach to providing services” (Daehnick, 1999:104).  Daehnick 
contrasts this description with demand orientation, which “implies a more decentralized 
organization, a user-pull approach to providing services, and a focus on 
responsiveness” (Daehnick, 1999:104).  To aid in making “value judgments about an 
architecture and especially to compare alternatives,” he lists the following attributes 
(values) that provide a means for qualitative description: performance, responsiveness, 
flexibility, robustness, logistics requirements, reliability/availability, ease of operations, 
environment impact, and cost (Daehnick, 1999:114-115).  Although this is clearly an 
attempt to incorporate VFT into space architecture decision making, formal decision 
analysis concepts such as mutual exclusivity, collective exhaustiveness, and preferential 
independence are not mentioned.   
Daehnick’s characterizations reveal that a proper VFT approach that captures 
the values of the user (in this thesis, the air warrior) is well-suited in making the 
transition from a command to a demand orientation, as command-oriented architectures 
are capital-intensive and lend themselves to incremental change, while the 
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responsiveness and adaptive nature of demand-oriented architectures are more in tune 
with what the user needs (Daehnick, 1999:104-105).  Tables 3 and 4 display 
Daehnick’s comparison of priorities (weights) that command- and demand-oriented 
architectures reflect. 
Table 3. Command-Oriented Architecture Priorities. 
 
H = High 
M = Medium 
L = Low 
Space Segment Ground Segment Launch Segment 
 Payload Constellation Craft TT&C Facilities User C2 Sites Vehicle 
Performance H H H H H M H H H 
Responsiveness M M M H M H M L L 
Flexibility M M L L M L L M L 
Robustness H H H M L L M M L 
Logistics 
Requirements L L L L L L L L L 
Reliability H H H H H H H H H 
Ease of 
Operations L L L M M M M L L 
Environmental 
Impact L L L L L L L M L 
Cost L L M L L M L L M 
Daehnick, 1999:118. 
 
Table 4. Demand-Oriented Architecture Priorities. 
 
H = High 
M = Medium 
L = Low 
Space Segment Ground Segment Launch Segment 
 Payload Constellation Craft TT&C Facilities User C2 Sites Vehicle 
Performance M H M M M H H H M 
Responsiveness M H M M H H H H H 
Flexibility L H H H M M H H H 
Robustness M H M M L H H H H 
Logistics 
Requirements 
L M M L L H L H H 
Reliability M H M M M H H L M 
Ease of 
Operations 
H M H H M H M M H 
Environmental 
Impact 
L L L L L L L M M 
Cost H M H M M M H H H 
Daehnick, 1999:119. 
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These priorities reflect relative, not absolute, priorities in design considerations.  
For example, a low priority item is not necessarily unimportant, but its priority would 
compare unfavorably with a high or medium priority item (Daehnick, 1999:118).  
Consistent definitions of “high,” “medium,” and “low” would strengthen the 
measurement of the priority each attribute receives in each orientation. 
Daehnick identifies other factors that come into play in space architecture 
decisions as determinants, and he groups them into three categories: requirements, 
technology, and budget (Daehnick, 1999:122).  These factors are largely out of the 
decision maker’s control.  He lists the groupings of determinants shown in Table 5 as 
follows: 
 
Table 5. Space Architecture Determinants. 
 
Requirements Technology Budget 
Global coverage DOD ability to drive technology In decline, especially for 
research, development, and 
acquisition 
Early access Increased emphasis on dual use Need to reduce life cycle costs 
Pop-up crises Microprocessor revolution 
Flexible, expandable 
capabilities 
Command, control, and 
communications improvements 
Miniaturization, structures, 
material 
Rapid throughout 
Standardization and modularity, 
flexible manufacturing 
Can market forces be tapped? 
Daehnick, 1999:131. 
 
 
Daehnick then raises the question of representing mathematically the value 
judgments implied in the orientation matrices Tables 3 and 4 and the by cross-
multiplying either the command-oriented matrix or the demand-oriented matrix with a 
matrix of the determinants (Daehnick 1999:130).  He suggests, if both the determinants 
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and the elements and attributes (values) could be represented mathematically, their 
matrices could be cross-multiplied to produce a “complete description of an 
architecture.”5  Like Wertz and Larson (1999:13), he is skeptical of measuring 
qualitative value judgments.  He instead recommends an approach that better 
accommodates the subjectivity inherent in dealing with qualities that are difficult to 
estimate, but that may lend itself to eventual quantification. 
Daehnick’s approach involves building a table of the attributes (values), one 
architectural element (e.g. the constellation) and its priority with respect to command- 
or demand-orientation, and the implications of each of the three determinants on the 
element.  This methodology would then extend to each element of the architecture.  
Table 6 shows these implications for a demand-oriented architecture with respect to the 
constellation element: 
                                                 
5 Although Daehnick’s suggestion to build quantitative measures to value judgments by using matrix 
multiplication has intuitive merit, he misses one of the requirements for matrix multiplication to take 
place: the number of columns in the first matrix must equal the number of rows in the second. 
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Table 6. Constellation Implications, Demand-Oriented Architecture.   
 Priority Implications — Constellation 
 Constellation Requirements Technology Budget 
Performance H Emphasis on 
systemic versus 
satellite measures 
Distributed 
architecture, use 
most recent 
technology 
Responsiveness H Right product 
available quickly to 
all users 
Tailored 
systems, rapid 
build and launch 
Flexibility H Adapt to changing 
situation 
Standardization, 
modularity,C3, 
on-board 
processing 
Robustness H Proliferate, degrade 
gracefully 
Autonomy, 
distribution, C3, 
on-board 
processing 
Logistics M Augment and 
replenish 
Standardization, 
modularity 
Reliability H Backup/swing 
capability vice 
individual system 
Redundancy, 
self-healing 
constellations 
Ease of 
Operations 
M More 
systems>need for 
standardized 
operations 
Autonomy, C3, 
processing, 
expert systems 
Because of the 
requirement for 
incorporation 
of multiple new 
technologies, 
need more 
R,D,&A 
money’ this is 
somewhat 
offset since 
many of the 
technologies 
are being 
pursued 
commercially 
Environment L Boost or deorbit Extra fuel, short-
life orbits 
No money for 
nuclear 
Cost M Trade off some 
capability for 
affordability 
Technology investment 
requirements heavy, but dual-use a 
possibility 
 Daehnick, 1999:134. 
 
 
As mentioned, this approach lacks quantitative measures to gauge how well a 
specific alternative meets a particular value.  While the implications are “derived from 
observation” (Daehnick, 1999:130), they are not traceable as presented in this form, and 
the method of observation is not specified.  It is unclear whose values have been 
elicited in Daehnick’s analysis, so it cannot be determined if the opinions of air 
warriors have been represented.   
The reasons Daehnick lists for the current command orientation of national 
security space architecture include compartmentalization due to security, a dearth of 
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well-documented requirements for expanded capabilities, bureaucratic turf wars, 
perceptions of technology limitations, cost, national politics, and “an inability to 
articulate requirements from the side of the war fighter” (Daehnick, 1999:121-122).  
This thesis addresses his call for a more focused effort at demand orientation for 
national security space architecture by soliciting the demands (values) from the air 
warfare experts themselves. 
VFT was also used in the source selection for the next generation of imagery 
satellites for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).  Burk, Deschappelles, Doty,  
Gayek, and Gurlitz (2002) applied VFT in the form of multiattribute value 
decomposition which resulted in 6 values at the first level (assuredness/robustness, 
design scalability, flexibility, quality, quantity, and timeliness) which were decomposed 
into 24 values at the second level, which themselves were decomposed into 256 
metrics6 (Burk et al., 2002: 49).  The second-level attributes and the metrics were 
unavailable in open sources. 
Loftis (2002) extracted preliminary value hierarchies by applying content 
analysis to national security space doctrine.  Using a method similar to the Silver 
Standard, three space doctrine documents were scanned to collect phrases that direct 
action toward objectives.  These phrases were then affinity-grouped in a manner similar 
to that of the verbs in the Foundations 2025 study (Parnell, Conley, Jackson, Lehmkuhl, 
and Andrew, 1998:1340-1344).  Value hierarchies consisting of the strategic objective 
and top two tiers were constructed for each doctrinal document from these groupings to 
                                                 
6 Burk et al. (2002) use different terminology, with  “attributes” and “sub-attributes” meaning the highest 
and second highest levels of the hierarchy, respectively, and “metrics” replacing attribute as previously 
defined. 
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provide a doctrinal basis for future value-focused national security space discussions.  
An extended excerpt from Loftis (2002) can be found in Appendix B. 
 
Literature Review — Applications of VFT in Space Architectural Element 
Decisions 
VFT also has practical applications in space decision making that concerns 
individual elements of space architecture.  Lehmkuhl, Lucia, and Feldman (2001) 
applied VFT to assist the GPS Joint Program Office in selecting the waveform for the 
next generation of GPS satellites.  In addition to its significance as a practical 
application of VFT to space decisions, an important result of this VFT model is its 
result in a waveform decision that was not initially the first choice of the review team.   
The NRO’s Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate (AS&T) was tasked 
with providing technology innovations to revolutionize global reconnaissance (Parnell, 
Gimeno, Westphal, Engelbrecht, and Szafranski, 2001:21-22).  A future value model 
for AS&T’s Technology Enterprise was requested to challenge its research and 
development (R&D) managers and technologists with audacious objectives (emphasis 
in original).   The strategic objective was to “provide technology innovations to 
revolutionize global reconnaissance,” and its supporting fundamental objectives were to 
“provide information superiority to enable NRO customers to revolutionize future 
capabilities,” to “reduce life cycle costs by an order of magnitude,” and to “rapidly 
design and deploy innovative technology solutions” (Parnell et al., 2001:22).  The value 
model was then used to compare the value and cost of projects in progress (Parnell et 
al., 2001:25-30).  Of particular interest to this study are the attributes used for some of 
the objectives under “visualize the operational space,” a sub-objective of “provide 
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information superiority…,” since they include qualitative values such as “plan in real-
time,” (Parnell et al., 2001:22) and “resolve political, economic, social, and military 
conflicts with no loss of life or resources” (Parnell et al., 2001:23).   
VFT was also applied in an effort to structure the resource allocation process of 
the NRO’s Operational Support Office (OSO) (Parnell, Bennett, Engelbrecht, and 
Szafranski, 2002).  Whereas the previous OSO process was described as “ad hoc” or 
“wing it” (Parnell et al., 2002:78), a value model was developed to score alternatives 
under consideration.  The Platinum Standard approach was used, with inputs coming 
from leaders and functional experts from both within the OSO and from other NRO 
organizations, and additional information supplied from OSO/NRO Gold Standard 
documents (Parnell et al., 2002:82 ).  The interviewees were asked to identify future 
OSO activities which were then aggregated into functions using affinity diagrams, and 
objectives were specified for each of these functions to form the qualitative value 
model.  Evaluation measures were developed for each objective by OSO management 
and technical leaders (Parnell et al., 2002:84).  
 
New Combat Demands, New Appreciation  
Much has changed in the U.S. defense posture since SPACECAST 2020 and AF 
2025 were published — a war on terrorism has commenced, new organizations for the 
defense of the homeland have been and are being erected, and major shifts in national 
space policy have taken place.  As new warfighting experience is accumulating, new 
requirements are developing, and new possibilities for space utilization are emerging, a 
new model of the value of national security space from the perspective of the air 
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warrior at the point of force application is warranted to capture perspectives not 
previously obtained. 
Having reviewed much of the professional literature that covers the interface of 
values and national security space decisions, attention in this thesis now turns to the 
research method used in this analysis of the air warrior’s value of national security 
space.   
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III. Research Method 
 
This chapter outlines the approach taken in the study.  An initial hierarchy was 
constructed from doctrine, and was given an initial face-validation by an operational 
expert, a graduate of the USAF Weapons School.  The initial hierarchy was then 
revised and presented to a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) for their input over a 
series of four facilitated discussions.  For difficult topics additional expertise was 
rendered through electronic discussions with a group of instructors from the USAF 
Weapons School.  The expertise found at the Weapons School is recognized as the 
highest in the Air Force, with only seven percent of the USAF fighter pilot community 
ever having attended (Hehs, 1995: paragraph 11).  Weapons School instructors are 
chosen from the best graduates after a tour of operational duty, representing an 
additional cut above the rest.   
After the values were identified, the SMEs then developed measures, single-
dimension value functions (SDVFs), and assigned local weights to the hierarchy, which 
was then modeled in a spreadsheet. 
 
The Initial Hierarchy 
The overarching strategic objective by which the value of space support to air 
combat is measured is Leverage Space Capabilities to Enhance Air Combat 
Operations.  This value is at the top of the value hierarchy developed in this study. 
As mentioned, the Gold Standard is often used when time with subject matter 
experts (SMEs) is limited.  Following the precedent set in the SPACECAST 2020 study 
(Burk and Parnell, 1997:66), doctrine provided the starting point for the initial 
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hierarchy.   An examination of joint doctrine revealed no document dedicated 
exclusively to air operations.  Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, Air Warfare, was 
examined and found to provide “initial guidance for conducting air operations as part of 
aerospace warfare” (AFDD 2-1, 2000:v) which is consistent with the aim of this thesis.  
AFDD 2-1 touts Asymmetric Force Strategy as a “new American way of war” that 
requires “sophisticated military capabilities to achieve national objectives and avoid 
costly force-on-force engagements” (AFDD 2-1, 2000:3), and the five components of 
Asymmetric Force Strategy were considered for the first tier of values. 
 
The First Tier Defined 
The first tier of values is taken from the following five components of 
Asymmetric Force Strategy (AFDD 2-1, 2000:3-5): the Commander’s 
Conceptualization of the Battlespace, Controlling the Battlespace, Decisive 
Maneuver, Precision Employment, and Integrated Sustainment.  The consideration 
of each as a candidate for a fundamental objective in support of the strategic objective, 
Leverage Space Capabilities to Enhance Air Warfare Operations and the rationale 
for acceptance or rejection is explained below: 
The Commander’s Conceptualization of the Battlespace “includes collecting 
and exploiting the information necessary to identify threats and opportunities regarding 
national interests” (AFDD 2-1, 2000:3).  National security space provides considerable 
leverage in support of these objectives, and thus was included as a candidate for a 
fundamental objective.  As this thesis is focused on the perspective from the cockpit, 
the qualifier Commander’s will be omitted.  This value is summarized in the hierarchy 
as “Understand.” 
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Controlling the Battlespace as defined in AFDD 2-1 (2000:4) is the freedom 
of operation necessary to enable friendly forces to “employ, maneuver, and engage 
forces while denying the same capability to the adversary,” and thus qualifies it as a 
means objective that supports the objectives of Decisive Maneuver and Precision 
Employment.  By virtue of using the same verbiage as these two other components, 
Controlling the Battlespace, while still a key concept, violates the independence 
requirement for a value hierarchy (Kirkwood, 1997:17-18) and was therefore 
eliminated as a direct candidate for a fundamental objective.   
Decisive Maneuver involves “positioning forces to gain favorable advantages” 
(AFDD 2-1, 2000:4).   National security space contributes to this objective by 
augmenting aircraft’s navigational capabilities, and is included for consideration as a 
fundamental objective.  This value is summarized in the hierarchy as “Move.” 
National security space contributes to Precision Employment by supplying 
information to make force application “truly precise” (AFDD 2-1, 2000:5).  Airpower 
assets are needed to “engage the adversary on land, at sea, or in the air,” and space 
capabilities, by virtue of their global view of these media (SPACECAST 2020, 1994: 
Introduction), can enhance Precision Employment.  It is thus included as a candidate 
for a fundamental objective.  This value is summarized in the hierarchy as “Fight.” 
Integrated Sustainment supports deploying and maintaining forces, and 
includes logistics, readiness, facilities, and modernization (AFDD 2-1, 2000:5).  
Although Integrated Sustainment is crucial to winning the air war, for the purpose of 
this study it was determined that these qualities fall outside of the context of national 
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security space decisions from the air warrior’s cockpit view.  Integrated Sustainment 
was thus eliminated as a candidate for a fundamental objective for this study. 
 The strategic objective and the initial hierarchy developed from AFDD 2-1 are 
shown in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1.  The Initial Hierarchy. 
 
First Tier Value Decomposition — “Understand” 
Value definition now proceeds down each first-tier branch.  The “Understand” value is 
shown in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2. The “Understand” Value and Its Branches. 
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Supporting the Conceptualization of the Battlespace are the values Vision and 
Communication.  These descend from two of the values that emerged from the 
SPACECAST 2020 study (Foreword): “unparalleled perspective (Vision) and very 
rapid access to the earth’s surface (Communication).”   
Understand — Vision 
According to AFDD 2-1 (2000:3), “collecting and exploiting the information 
necessary to identify threats and opportunities” is essential to conceptualizing the 
battlespace.  The concepts of collecting/exploiting information and identifying 
threats/opportunities, translate into Coverage and Identification from space-based 
systems.  As space offers unparalleled perspective (SPACECAST 2020: Foreword), it 
follows that that all aspects of earth coverage of events that concern the air warrior 
must be considered: Airspace Coverage, Surface Coverage, and coverage of the 
electromagnetic spectrum (EM Space Coverage).  As information is collected using 
space-based capabilities, its exploitation value is dependent on how well the event can 
be identified, thus marking Identification as a value that falls under Vision. 
Understand — Communication 
Conceptualizing the battlespace is enhanced by the availability of information 
from elements outside the cockpit.  JP 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, 
describes the importance of Communication to conceptualizing the battlespace:  
The ability to exchange near real-time data (such as targeting information) 
enhances situational awareness and combat coordination between various 
force elements including EW (electronic warfare) strike and/or execution assets, 
command-control units, ES (electronic warfare support) collection units, 
supported units, and others, is a critical combat requirement. (JP 3-51, 2000:III-
6, boldface in original, italics added for emphasis) 
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The emphasis on near real-time data implies that Timeliness is a value that specifies 
the importance of communication.  JP 3-51 also specifies that the exchange of data 
between force elements must be routine (JP 3-51, 2000: III-6).  For a routine exchange 
of data to take place clarity should be the norm; constant querying of transmitted 
messages would indicate the exchange has not become routine practice.  Thus, Fidelity 
is proposed as a value that supports Communication. 
 
First Tier Value Decomposition — “Move” 
Continuing with the breakdown of the first-tier values, Decisive Maneuver, 
summarized as “Move,” is the second first-tier value that national security space 
capabilities can enhance.  The expanded “Move” value is shown in Figure 3, and is 
specified below: 
 
 
Figure 3. The “Move” Value and Its Branches. 
 
   According to AFDD 2-1, Decisive Maneuver is “positioning forces to gain 
favorable advantages over an adversary or event in anticipation of engagement or 
strike”, with an emphasis on transitioning to Precision Employment (AFDD 2-1, 
2000:4).  Positioning is thus a value that supports Decisive Maneuver.  Maneuvers 
must also be executed at the right time and in the right sequence in accordance with the 
Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP).  According to AFDD 2-1, “the characteristics of 
targets may also dictate the assignment of timing requirements to their order of attack 
“Move” 
Positioning Timing Timeliness 
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in the MAAP.”  This implies that the “Move” objective requires a sense of Timing in 
addition to Positioning.  Finally, as the pace of air combat can be crucial to the 
outcome, the speed at which Positioning and Timing can be acquired is added as a 
value expressed as Timeliness.  Together, Positioning, Timing, and Timeliness are 
grouped as Navigation. 
   
First Tier Value Decomposition — “Fight” 
Precision Employment is the final first-tier value to define.  The expanded 
“Fight” value is shown in Figure 4, and its specification follows: 
 
Figure 4. The “Fight” Value and Its Branches. 
 
The “Fight” value is derived from Precision Employment, found in AFDD 2-1 
(2000:5).  Taken directly from the title, Precision describes a value space capabilities 
may add to air combat operations.  Putting policy considerations aside, national security 
space may also aid in denying an adversary information which may threaten aircrews, 
in support of the same objectives as the policy of securing the exclusive rights to 
imagery over an area of conflict, as was the case over Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. 
(Morning Edition, 2002).  Space-based Information Denial thus constitutes a value 
that may aid the air warrior. 
“Fight” 
Precision Information Denial 
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Value Elicitation 
The initial hierarchy formed the basis for interactive value elicitation from a 
panel of air combat experts with the requisite training and experience to offer expert 
opinion on air combat operations.  The qualifications of the members of the panel are 
outlined in Table 7: 
Table 7. Qualifications of the Air Combat Expert Panel. 
Combat Role 
and Platform 
Service Experience 
F-14 Pilot Navy Recently returned from deployment in East Asia 
F-14 Radar 
Intercept Officer 
Navy Operation Southern Watch 
EA-6B ECM* 
Officer 
Navy Operation Southern Watch, Operation Joint 
Forge, Operation Enduring Freedom 
EA-6B ECM* 
Officer 
Navy Operation Southern Watch, Operation Northern 
Watch, Operation Enduring Freedom 
F/A-18 Pilot Navy Operation Enduring Freedom, recently returned 
from deployment in East Asia 
F-15E Pilot Air Force Operation Noble Eagle 
F-15C Pilot Air Force Operation Northern Watch, Operation Southern 
Watch 
B-52 Pilot Air Force Test pilot, previous combat alert duty in support 
of Middle Eastern Theater air operations 
CH-46 Pilot Marine Corps Operation Allied Force, Operation Enduring 
Freedom 
 * Electronic Countermeasures 
 
Of note is the joint nature of the group, with operational experience from three 
branches of the U.S. armed services represented. 
 
Specifying the Decision Context 
When identifying the values the SMEs were told that two conditions were 
necessary for a value to qualify.  The first was that it had to represent something 
important to their cockpit mission.  The second was that it had to be a quality that 
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national security space capabilities provide or enhance.  They were also told to exclude 
perceived budget and policy limitations and to focus their attention on what they value. 
 
Determining the Measures and Single Dimensional Value Functions 
Keeney and Raiffa note that “choosing a utility function subject to the given 
constraints is somewhat of a heuristic process” (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:198).7  In the 
context of choosing a utility function that may be “almost appropriate” versus searching 
for one that is “more appropriate” (quotes in original), they acknowledge that the 
decision maker is faced with weighing the disadvantages of each.  Due to operational 
and resource restrictions, casual empiricism with the SMEs for this study was 
accomplished over a spectrum of distances via facilitated meetings, one-on-one 
interviews, and e-mail dialogue.  To clarify such a complex and abstract subject as 
values, measures, and value functions across a diffusely located group of experts, this 
approach was the best fit. 
In the facilitated discussions a set of candidate measures was reviewed, and the 
SMEs were asked to choose the most appropriate, or to improve them as needed.  
Upper and lower bounds were set, along with a direction of preference.  The SMEs 
were asked if any measures were constrained by thresholds, and what effect failure to 
meet a threshold would have on the value under consideration. 
With measures identified the focus turned to assessing the single dimension 
value functions (SDVFs).  The SMEs were presented with three generic examples of 
SDVFs for the cases of both increasing and decreasing monotonicity: linear, 
exponential, and S-curve (later modified to piecewise linear).  They were then asked to 
                                                 
7 In 1976 the term “utility function” meant what we now refer to as “value functions.” 
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assign value on a scale of 0 to 1 for levels of attainment of each measure according to 
the type of value function.  For linear measures only the endpoints were necessary to 
plot, for exponential functions the endpoints plus the level that corresponds to a value 
of 0.5 was assessed, and for piecewise linear functions the value at each transition from 
one rate of value change to another was plotted. 
In cases where the value assessed depended on the operational scenario (for 
example, the degree of acceptable collateral damage), the SMEs were told to assume 
that the most restrictive conditions applied (e.g., minimal collateral damage). 
 
Weighting the Hierarchy 
 Per Stillwell, von Winterfelt, and John (1987:443), local weighting is 
recommended for hierarchies constructed from the top down. This was the method 
chosen for this hierarchy.  To preserve consistent understanding of the definitions of 
each value, the SMEs themselves were asked to weight each branch of the hierarchy. 
 
Choosing an Overall Value Function 
 Utility independence conditions may be used to specify the final form of the 
value function (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:224).  For this analysis mutual preferential 
independence was assumed, implying that overall value function is additive linear.  As 
will be shown in Chapter IV, the additive linear function was modified by adding 
indicator variables to account for measures for which failure to meet the threshold 
eliminated all value. 
 
   38
IV. Results 
 
Description of the Hierarchy 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the strategic objective is Leverage Space 
Capabilities to Enhance Air Combat Operations.  After reviewing the initial 
hierarchy presented in Chapter III, the SMEs developed it into a hierarchy that 
represented their values.  In this process they identified three first-tier values that 
support the strategic objective: Communication, Navigation, and Denial.  The SMEs 
felt that the contributions of Communication and Navigation to the strategic objective 
would sufficiently different with respect to the phase of the operation that they should 
be weighted differently.  Each is therefore divided into Pre-Flight and In-Flight 
components to allow for different weighting with respect to the combat planning and 
execution phases of air operations.   
The full hierarchy is shown below in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5.  The Value Hierarchy. 
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A description of each branch follows, and the measures with their SDVFs can 
be found in Appendix C.  
Communication 
The complete decomposition of Communication is shown in Figure 6.  The 
numbers in parentheses represent the local weights assigned by the SMEs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Indicates value preservation threshold beneath which value for all of parent value is eliminated. 
Figure 6.  The Communication Value and Its Branches.   
 
As mentioned, Communication was divided into Pre-Flight and In-Flight 
components.  These were each divided into Voice and Data components, which were 
themselves divided into Span and Reliability.  At this point the SMEs agreed that 
Span and Reliability could be broken down no further. 
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Early in the elicitation process the SMEs recognized that particular thresholds of 
Communication must be met in order for a system to have value at higher levels.  To 
incorporate this characteristic measures were identified that have value preservation 
thresholds, which only allow nonzero value when the threshold has been exceeded.  
Precedent for this can be found in Kerchner, Deckro, and Kloeber (2001:51-52), in 
which thresholds of attainment were identified for certain measures of Psychological 
Operations (PSYOPS) products.  For a PSYOP product to contribute any value toward 
an objective, it the PSYOPS value model required to meet a threshold value for certain 
measures.  In a similar fashion the measures shown in Table 8 that support the 
Communication value were deemed to have thresholds. 
Table 8. Value Preservation Thresholds for Communication Values. 
Value Measure Threshold Threshold-
Dependent Value 
Communication — Pre-Flight — 
Voice — Reliability 
Uptime During Pre-
flight Planning 
75% Communication — Pre-
Flight — Voice — Span 
Communication — Pre-Flight — 
Data — Reliability 
Uptime During Pre-
flight Planning 
75% Communication — Pre-
Flight — Data — Span 
Communication — In-Flight —
Voice — Reliability 
Uptime During 
Operation 
90% Communication — In-
Flight — Voice — Span 
Communication — In-Flight — 
Data — Reliability 
Uptime During 
Operation 
90% Communication — In-
Flight — Data — Span 
 
In reviewing the thresholds elicited, it can be seen that the air warrior requires a 
high degree of reliability for in-flight voice and data communication.  If it is to be 
valued in the fight, it must be held to be dependable. 
 
Navigation 
After dividing Navigation into Pre-flight and In-flight components, the SMEs 
changed very little from the “Move” value in the initial hierarchy.  As one indicator of 
the difference in Navigation value with respect to operational phase, the SMEs 
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considered Timeliness to be worthy of inclusion only in the In-flight portion of 
Navigation.  The remainder of Navigation is symmetric, consisting of Positioning, 
Timing, and Reliability, which then had measures attached. 
The complete decomposition of Navigation is shown in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  The Navigation Value and Its Branches. 
 
Denial. 
The SMEs defined Denial as the ability of a space-based system to protect 
aircrews from threats.  The full decomposition of Denial is shown in Figure 8. 
Navigation 
(0.3)
Pre-Flight 
(0.25) In-Flight (0.75)
Position (0.2) 
Timing (0.4) 
Reliability (0.4) 
Position (0.25) 
Timing (0.25) 
Reliability (0.25) Timeliness (0.25) 
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Figure 8.  The Denial Value and Its Branches. 
 
The SMEs felt that, should a space-based capability to protect aircrews be 
developed, it would be important for that capability to deny an adversary information 
and to destroy threats that the adversary may pose.  Information Denial was specified 
to have two components, Adversary Communication and Adversary Navigation.  
These values were broken down in the same manner as the Communication and 
Navigation values in the first tier of the hierarchy, with the reasoning being that 
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opponents in an armed conflict, both being human, will value Communication and 
Navigation in the same way.  The SMEs decided, however, that the thresholds 
identified in Communication would not apply to Adversary Communication, and 
that denying an adversary a reliable navigation capability in both phases was the only 
value that should be included under Adversary Navigation 
The other value under Denial is Threat Destruction.  This value could not be 
further decomposed by the SMEs, and its value was determined to be best expressed in 
qualitative terms.  The measuring scale was categorical in the direction of increasing 
threat.   
 
The Measures and Single-Dimensional Value Functions  
The base-level measures identified by the SMEs are listed below in Table 9.  All 
but one of them (Threat Destruction) are repeated in the hierarchy due to the division 
of values by mission phase and the assumed similarity of Communication and 
Navigation appreciation on the part of both friendly and adversary forces.  Complete 
descriptions of each measure and its associated SDVF can be found in Appendix C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   45
Table 9.  Measures at the Base Level of the Hierarchy. 
Base-Level Value Measure Comments 
Bandwidth 
Increase 
Bandwidth was identified as a proxy for 
the volume of information.  Although an 
argument could be made for naming the 
value Capacity, the SMEs retained the 
term Span.  The SMEs felt that the value 
of increased bandwidth could best be 
expressed as a factor of improvement over 
current capability. 
Span 
Area of Coverage Fixing a numerical value on the area of 
coverage proved problematic, so a 
categorical measure was identified to 
represent increments of value to the air 
warrior. 
Reliability Uptime The % of time the capability is available. 
Horizontal Error Error (in ft).  The SMEs thought that ft is 
more commonly used than meters by 
aircrews. 
Positioning 
Altitude Error See Horizontal Error comments. 
Timing Timing Error Difference from true time in sec. 
Timeliness Update Time Time between request and receipt for a 
navigational update . 
Threat Destruction Level of Threat No direct measure for threat level posed 
by an adversary could be readily 
identified, so value was assessed according 
to categories. 
 
 
It was decided that some values could not be measured on a continuous scale, 
and could be better expressed categorically.  For these measures the value for each 
category was directly assigned.  For the Threat Destruction value consensus between 
the points of view of the B-52 pilot and the fighter pilots was reached in the following 
manner.  All were asked to rank and number the four threat categories (anti-aircraft 
artillery (AAA), tactical surface-to-air missile (SAM), strategic SAM, and airborne 
aircraft) in increasing order (1 to 4).  The ranks for each threat category were then 
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summed and normalized to find their relative value.  The results are presented below in 
Table 10: 
 
Table 10.  Assessed Values of Threat Destruction. 
 AAA Tactical 
SAM 
Strategic
SAM 
Airborne 
Aircraft 
Bomber 1 3 2 4 
Fighter 1 2 4 3 
Total 2 5 6 7 
Normalized Value = 
(Fighter + Bomber)/8 
 
2/8 
 
5/8 
 
6/8 
 
7/8 
 
 
Weights 
 As mentioned, the hierarchy was weighted locally.  The SMEs were asked to 
examine each value, beginning with the first tier, and determine the relative weights of 
each with the constraint that they all sum to one.   
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V. Conclusions 
The SPACECAST 2020 study was completed in 1994, nine years prior to this 
one.  Values, objectives, and the technical means to achieve them change over time, 
and the SMEs were asked to recommend a revisit time for this study.  In their judgment 
five years is an adequate revisit time to determine if changes in objectives and means 
have caused changes in the air warrior’s value structure for space capabilities. 
 
Insights Revealed 
This analysis reveals several insights into space support for air operations that 
have not been documented in previous studies of the value of national security space.  
The conclusions that can be drawn from this research include 
1. The value of space support varies according to the mission phase. 
 
2. The air warrior’s demand for data in the cockpit is expected to grow as more 
is supplied. 
 
3. Thresholds exist for reliability measures that eliminate the entire 
contribution of the parent value to the overarching strategic objective. 
 
More discussion of these conclusions follows. 
 
Mission Phase Matters 
The value the air warrior places on the space-enabled capabilities delivered 
varies with phase of operation.  Weights for both Communication and Navigation 
were 0.25 for the pre-flight phase in which mission planning is the focus, but soared to 
0.75 for the in-flight portion in which rapid decision-making and intense multi-tasking 
occupy much of the air warrior’s time.  This insight has operational implications for 
synchronizing Space Tasking Orders (STOs) with Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) for a 
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given theater or theaters (AFDD 2-2, 2001:37-39).  Space support to the air warrior 
should be optimized for the time periods when more aircraft are in the in-flight phase, 
as specified by the ATO for a given operation.8 
Data vs. Voice 
A picture is worth a thousand words, or, in the air warrior’s parlance: a heads-
up display image is worth a thousand voice transmissions.  The air warrior forecasts a 
burgeoning need for data, as proxied by the measure of bandwidth.  Although there is 
some uncertainty specifying the upper end of the scale for the air warrior’s value of 
data volume, there is no contest in the air warrior’s mind between data and voice 
communication.  A set of images gives the air warrior a far better concept of the 
battlespace than does a set of voice transmissions.  The only limitation on the air 
warrior’s value of data mentioned in the discussions was human processing ability. 
Value Preservation Thresholds 
Another insight not found in previous VFT analyses of national security space is 
that of reliability thresholds.  The expected percentage of operational time, either in-
flight or pre-flight, that a communication system is available is an indicator of its 
overall value for the specific function and phase desired (e.g., pre-flight data 
communication).  If the air warrior cannot expect a system to be available for at least 
the threshold percentage, it contributes zero value not only to its reliability score but 
also to its span score.  Although SPACECAST 2020 included an availability score for 
communication value, it was not linked to the other scores subsumed by 
                                                 
8 No de-emphasis of warriors not fighting in the air medium is intended here.  As this analysis only 
covers space support to the air warrior, inferences cannot be drawn on a broader scope than that of air 
operations.  Further analysis on space support to all warfighters is recommended to determine if phase is 
a consideration for space support for them. 
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communication.  The air warrior’s value of communication as modeled in this thesis, on 
the other hand, displays a dependency of span on reliability. 
 
The Overall Value Function  
To define the overall value function, let the overall weight of the ith measure, 
wi, be defined as the product of each local weight and the weights immediately above it 
in the hierarchy.  Let Xi denote the ith measure, and vi(Xi) denote the SDVF for each 
measure.  To account for the value preservation thresholds in the communication 
reliability measures, let the indicator variable I have a value of one when the threshold 
is met, and zero otherwise.  Let the set R contain each value in the model whose 
contribution is eliminated by threshold non-attainment (communication Reliability and 
Span).  The overall value function is then 
∑∑
∈∉
+=
Ri
iiii
Ri
iii XvwIXvwXv )()()(  
For this analysis a companion spreadsheet with measures, SDVFs, and overall 
value function was developed.  This spreadsheet accompanies all electronic copies of 
this thesis. 
(1) 
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VI. Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for the Present Study 
Classified Value Elicitation 
Although the SMEs deemed an unclassified value hierarchy to be sufficient, a 
value elicitation environment free of classification constraints is desired.  This would 
presumably strengthen the focus on values by encouraging out-of-the-box thinking on 
the part of the SMEs.  The high classification of many national security space activities 
considerably narrows the breadth of understanding in the warfighting community 
(Toler and Tindell, 2003).  Since no major declassification of national security space 
looms on the horizon, a study in an environment that allows for classified discussion of 
values and measures is recommended to augment this one. 
Comparing Systems 
Two different types of analysis of alternatives are recommended for this model: 
analysis of different systems and analysis of different versions of the same system.  The 
value model may be used to compare different architectures to assess their contribution 
to winning the air war in a given scenario, or to aid in source selection for a specific 
capability.  For example, when different contractors are being considered for a 
communications system, the model can be used to assess the value each delivers to the 
air warrior. 
The value model may also be used to assess the improvement of one version of 
a system over its predecessor, particularly if new capabilities are added.  For example, 
if a space-based navigation system should happen to have a communications package 
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as a secondary payload, the model can evaluate the value of such a configuration to the 
air warrior.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
As is usually done in multiple criteria decision analyses, sensitivity analysis is 
recommended to determine if an alternative is sensitive to variation in weights. 
Cost Analysis 
The output of the model is a numerical result between 0 and 1.  This value can 
be divided by a system’s cost to derive a benefit/cost ratio for comparing alternatives, 
following the precedent of Kerchner (2001:49-50).  The cost need not be expressed 
solely in dollars — a value hierarchy that expresses cost in other terms, such as 
international political costs of space force application or research and development 
opportunity cost due to diverted national technical resources may be built.  It is 
recommended that a cost hierarchy be elicited from the stewards of the public purse 
(the Office of Management and Budget, for example), as they represent the key 
decision makers on whose shoulders the cost of a space capability falls.  
Test for Mutual Preferential Independence 
Kirkwood (1997:239) specifies that Mutual Preferential Independence (MPI) is 
necessary to justify the additive value function.  Every effort was made to ensure this 
concept in the development and elicitation stages of this model.  The only exceptions, 
of course, were the reliability thresholds that affect other values in the model.  
Although the additive value function has been shown to be robust under moderately 
non-ideal conditions (Stewart, 1996:301-309), further research should be accomplished 
to ensure that MPI holds at least moderately well for this model. 
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Elicit Values from All Warfighters 
This analysis of the air warrior’s value of national security space should be 
broadened to determine how other warfighters value space.  This analysis is a first cut 
at the larger problem of integrating space capabilities into the entire battlespace. 
 
Recommendations for VFT Studies in General 
Standardize Terminology 
As Keeney notes in Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative 
Decisionmaking, Alternative-Focused Thinking (AFT) is “the ‘natural’ way we have all 
learned to deal with decisions” (Keeney, 1992:6).  SMEs are valued for their expertise 
within a given decision context, which has usually been accrued over time by 
evaluating and selecting alternatives.  They therefore enter into facilitation with an AFT 
mindset.  Communicating the idea of value requires them to think about what lies 
behind alternatives that makes them valuable or not, and this can be a time-consuming 
process that requires careful facilitation. 
The multiple meanings of the word “value” itself compound this difficulty when 
used in facilitation.  In current VFT parlance “value” can take on different meanings:  
1.  A quantitative result from an evaluation (the value of space to air combat). 
2.  The evaluation considerations that are distilled by using the WITI test. 
 
Military SMEs are already accustomed to thinking in terms of core “values.”  Care 
must be taken during facilitation discussions to establish common understanding of 
value terminology. 
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Elicit a Revisit Time from SMEs 
Objectives change, alternatives change, lessons are learned.  At the time of the 
present writing, nine years have passed since SPACECAST 2020 was published.  As 
was noted in Chapter I, many changes in national security space organization, policy, 
and technology have come about since then.  To capture possible changes in values as a 
result of changes in means and ends, the value hierarchy should be updated after a time 
period specified by the SMEs.  When asked when they would expect their values to 
change sufficiently to revisit the analysis, the SMEs responded that five years would be 
a good time to conduct this study again.  To account for changing values, leadership 
turnover, and improvements in means of reaching goals, a SME-specified revisit time 
should be included as part of every VFT analysis.   
 
   54
Appendix A.  A Review of VFT Hierarchies. 
Value-Focused Thinking 
Ralph Keeney, in his text entitled Value-Focused Thinking, states “values are 
what we care about… (and) should be the driving force for our decision-making” 
(Keeney, 1992:1).  Values are what matter to us, the “principles used for evaluation” 
(Keeney, 1992:6) of alternatives, but, he contends, the usual approach to decision 
making takes a different form that he terms “Alternative-Focused Thinking (AFT)” 
(Keeney, 1992:4). 
The AFT approach begins with identifying the problem, and then continues with 
immediate consideration of available alternatives.  After identifying the alternatives the 
next step is to select the best from among them.9    The visibility of, and familiarity 
with, available alternatives tends to influence the values which the decision maker 
thinks are important, thus masking many of the values that are germane to the decision.  
In this approach, values are made explicit by alternatives.  Consideration of alternatives 
often involves listing their advantages and disadvantages, which in turn determine the 
values by which the decision maker will judge the alternatives.  Sifting through 
alternatives and then identifying the principles used for their evaluation holds a great 
deal of intuitive appeal, as alternatives represent the “what to do” part of the decision.  
Keeney considers it to be “the easy way out of a decision problem,” however, with “a 
price to be paid later when the consequences accrue” (Keeney, 1992:6).  The danger in 
                                                 
9 In addition to Keeney (1992:4), Charles Lindblom in “The Science of Muddling Through” (Lindblom, 
1959) asserts that decision-making often begins with alternatives, but uses it to advance a quite different 
view.  Essentially, he holds that most problems are too complex for an exhaustive consideration of all 
available alternatives and their consequences, and that merely tweaking previously known alternatives 
offers a sufficient problem-solving paradigm. 
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this approach is twofold:  first, what is important to the decision maker may be outside 
the span of values originally encompassed by the alternatives considered, and second, 
much time may be wasted sifting through alternatives before a method of measurement 
has been identified. 
In contrast, Keeney offers Value-Focused Thinking (VFT) as a higher leverage 
approach to decision making than AFT.  Central to the VFT approach is the recognition 
that decisions need not be considered problems, but opportunities to create alternatives 
(Keeney, 1992:8) by beginning with what matters: values (Keeney, 1992:8-9).  He 
states that “values of decision makers are made explicit with objectives,” (Keeney, 
1992:33) and goes on to explain that the decision maker’s true values that drive the 
decision should be identified before examining alternatives (Keeney, 1992:22). 
Listing objectives in order to explicate values is a good start toward identifying 
values; organizing them according to purpose helps structure the decision making 
process.  To link objectives with values, Keeney separates objectives into two types: 
fundamental and means (Keeney, 1992:34).  Fundamental objectives are those that 
describe why the decision is important to the decision maker; means objectives 
prescribe a means of attaining a higher objective.    
To link means objectives to the fundamental objectives they support, Keeney 
applies the “Why is this important?” (WITI) test for means objectives, which asks the 
decision maker why he/she thinks a particular means objective is worth pursuing.  This 
may lead to another means objective, which will also be subject to the WITI test.  The 
WITI test is repeatedly applied in this manner.   Using this process, a candidate for a 
fundamental objective is identified when the response to WITI test is independent of 
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any other objective.  In other words, when an objective is important on its own merit, 
and not merely because it supports another objective, it may represent a fundamental 
objective (Keeney, 1992:66).   
Keeney goes on to caution that both fundamental and strategic objectives satisfy 
the WITI test for a means objective (emphasis added), and states that a legitimate 
fundamental objective should only be influenced by alternatives within the decision 
context.  If a candidate fundamental objective can be influenced by alternatives outside 
the decision context, then a means objective that supports the candidate fundamental 
objective is the actual fundamental objective (Keeney, 1992:67).   
Relating Values to Each Other 
Application of the WITI test begs the question “how important is this?”  It is not 
enough to say an objective has value, but a method is needed to determine what 
objectives have more weight than others.  To this end a model called a value hierarchy 
can be constructed to depict the relationships of the objectives to each other.  The 
hierarchy depicts the strategic objective at the top, with the fundamental objectives that 
support it in the first tier. Each fundamental objective consists of its own supporting 
objectives in the second tier.  This pattern continues until the base level is reached 
(Kirkwood, 1997:13).  This final level consists of objectives that cannot be broken 
down further into more basic elements.  An example of a generic value hierarchy is 
shown in Figure 9: 
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Figure 9.  A Generic Value Hierarchy.  An illustration of how a strategic objective, 
fundamental objectives, and supporting objectives are structured. 
 
This model forms the basis for scoring alternatives to determine which contributes the 
most to satisfy the strategic objective. 
When the value hierarchy is completed, attributes (measures) are identified that 
represent measurement of the base level objectives (Kirkwood, 1997:24-28).  Attributes 
are quantifiable qualities that measure the degree of attainment of the lowest tier 
objectives.  Other terms used include measure of effectiveness, measure of 
performance, and criterion (Keeney, 1992:100).   
Keeney goes on to identify three categories of attributes: natural, constructed, 
and proxy (Keeney, 1992:101).  Natural attributes are those that can directly be 
interpreted without much specialized knowledge.  For example, coverage area directly 
expresses how much of the earth’s surface is accessible to a satellite, without much 
specialized knowledge needed to understand its meaning.  Constructed attributes are 
those developed specifically for a given decision context (Keeney, 1992:102).  An 
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example of a constructed attribute is the G/T ratio (gain-to-noise temperature) used to 
specify the performance of communications antennas; a more commonly encountered 
one is the system used to rank universities by national periodicals.  Particular measures 
such as money donated by alumni and SAT scores are developed, weighted, and added 
together to form a score by which alternatives are ranked.  Proxy attributes (proxies, for 
short) are used when direct measures cannot be easily identified.  Proxies substitute for 
direct measures on the basis of a “perceived relationship” to the achievement of an 
objective (Keeney, 1992:103).  Keeney uses the relationship of pollution to structural 
damage to illustrate this concept.  Where an objective in environmental planning may 
be to minimize this kind of damage, a direct measure may be difficult to identify.  In 
this case sulfur dioxide concentration could be used as a proxy attribute to indicate 
damage to structures (Keeney, 1992:103).  Kirkwood distinguishes proxies by 
contrasting them with direct attributes, which offer a direct means of measuring the 
attainment of an objective, as opposed to associating it with a substitute measure 
(Kirkwood, 1997:24). 
Attributes are the numerical input into single dimensional value functions 
(SDVFs), which score the value of each level of attainment for each attribute on a 
common scale.  The simplest SDVF is linear in form, where value increases or 
decreases linearly as the level of attribute attainment increases. 
Kirkwood (1997:62-68) recommends two types of SDVFs: piecewise linear and 
exponential.  The piecewise linear SDVF is assessed with the assumption that the value 
of each attribute will change linearly for one or more increments of increase in 
measure.  The rate of increase need not be the same for the entire scale; the change in 
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value added (or decreased) may indeed vary over various portions of it.  A hypothetical 
example of a piecewise linear SDVF is shown in Figure 10, where value increases at 
different linear rates over the measurement scale of the attribute. 
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Figure 10. A Hypothetical Increasing Piecewise Linear SDVF. 
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and in equation (3) for a monotonically decreasing value function: 
 
ρ ≠ infinity 
otherwise
(2) 
 
   60
v(x) = 
( )
( )









−
−



 −−−



 −−−
0
0
*
*
*exp1
*exp1
xx
xx
xx
xx
ρ
ρ
 
 
where exp [·] denotes the exponential function, x is the attribute under consideration, x* 
represents the highest value that x can attain, x0 is the lowest value for x, and ρ is a term 
called the exponential constant which determines the shape of the value function.  For 
ρ>0 the SDVF will be concave, for ρ<0 the SDVF will be convex, and as ρ approaches 
infinity the SDVF will approach linearity. 
When the maximum increase or decrease in value occurs in the middle of the 
attribute scale the S-curve value function may be most appropriate.  This function 
depicts slow changes in value at the extremes of the attribute scale, but rapid changes 
near the center.  A hypothetical decreasing S-curve function is illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11. A Hypothetical Decreasing S-curve SDVF. 
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The exponential SDVF can also be used to express the decision maker’s attitude 
toward risk (Kirkwood 1997:138-139).  When applied in this fashion it is called the risk 
tolerance, with risk aversion expressed by ρ>0, risk seeking by ρ<0, and risk neutrality 
by ρ → infinity.  When the decision maker’s attitude toward risk is assessed in this 
manner, the value function is termed a utility function and is denoted by u(x). 
Finally, the additive linear value function is formed by weighting the SDVFs 
according to the preferences of the decision maker and then summing.10  The equation 
for the hierarchy shown in Figure 12 has the following form: 
v(X1, X2, …, Xn) = w1v1(X1) + w2v2(X2) + ··· + wnvn(Xn)  (4) 
where each Xi is the score for each attribute, the vi’s are the SDVFs for each attribute, 
the wi’s are the global weights for each value elicited from the decision maker, and n is 
the number of attributes.  With all vi(Xi) bounded by 0 and 1, equation (4) expresses the 
value of an alternative in such a fashion that the least possible score is 0, and the best 
possible score is 1.   
 
 
Figure 12.  Hierarchical Display of a Single-Tier Additive Value Function With 3 Attributes  
 
                                                 
10 Kirkwood (1992:253) also describes a value function form called the multiplicative utility function, 
which takes the risk preference of the decision maker into account and is usually determined by direct 
assessment (1992:254). 
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Equation (4) expresses the value function as a linear combination of the 
attributes.  Many sources in the literature (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:230), (Keeney, 
1992:134), (Kirkwood, 1997:249), (Clemen and Reilly, 2001:652) state that attributes 
must be additive independent for the linear additive value model to hold, and that 
additive independence requires that all attributes be mutually preferentially 
independent.  This essentially means that the preference ordering of the consequences 
of any attribute do not depend on the level of attainment of any other attribute or set of 
attributes. 
To this point value hierarchies that contain only a single tier of fundamental 
objectives below the strategic objective have been addressed.  For hierarchies with 
more than one tier below the strategic objective there exist three schemes of weighting.  
Non-hierarchical (or global) weighting is used to value each attribute against every 
other in the hierarchy (Stillwell, von Winterfeldt, and John, 1987:443), thus expressing 
each attribute’s contribution to the strategic objective on a global basis.  Global 
weighting takes place entirely at the bottom level, with the weights of all attributes 
summing to 1.  For hierarchies constructed using a bottom-up approach (the Silver 
Standard) global weighting may be most appropriate, but for hierarchies with large 
numbers of attributes this scheme requires numerous value judgments to be made.  
Hierarchical (or local) weighting assesses the weight of each objective according to its 
contribution to the objective immediately above it (Stillwell et al., 1987:443), with the 
weights of the values that comprise a single objective summing to 1.  As these 
assessments reflect judgments made regarding contributions to a single objective, this 
method may be most appropriate for values constructed using a top-down approach (the 
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Gold Standard) that identifies values by breaking down fundamental objectives into 
their sub-objectives.  Stillwell et al. also briefly describe a higher-level value hierarchy, 
with attributes and weights assessed at the upper-level tiers of the hierarchy (Stillwell et 
al., 1987:443).  This thesis will only consider local and global weighting schemes. 
Clemen and Reilly (2001:625) address the manner in which an attribute’s 
overall weight within a locally weighted multiple tier hierarchy can be found.  The 
overall weight for a single attribute is calculated by multiplying its local weight by the 
local weight of each objective directly above it up to and including the first tier.  For 
the hierarchy in Figure 13, global weights for supporting objectives 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 
would be 0.3 X 0.4 = 0.12, 0.3 X 0.4 = 0.12, and 0.3 X 0.2 = 0.06, respectively. 
 
Figure 13. Generic Value Hierarchy With Local Weights Added. 
Kirkwood specifies the characteristics a value hierarchy should have: 
completeness, nonredundancy, decomposability, operability, and small size (Kirkwood, 
1997:16).  Completeness means that every key value of the decision maker should be 
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included in the model; omitting one or more would not fully evaluate an alternative 
under consideration.  This concept is also called collective exhaustiveness (Keeney, 
1992:78).  Nonredundancy requires that each value be counted only once in the 
hierarchy; double counting would give a value disproportionate weight in the model.  
Related to nonredundancy is mutual exclusivity (Keeney, 1992:78), which specifies 
that each objective in a hierarchy should be defined in such a manner that its 
components can be clearly separated into clearly discrete components.  This is often 
combined with the preceding characteristic to form the MECE (mutually exclusive, 
collectively exhaustive) principle.   
Decomposability occurs when the contribution of one measure is independent of 
the contribution of the others.  An example of a value that is not decomposable comes 
from Kirkwood:  in the context of looking for employment, suppose that the value 
“economic issues” consists of “pension benefits,” “salary,” and “medical coverage.” 
The value of a good salary may be offset by a bad pension or bad medical plan.  In this 
case “economic issues” is not decomposable, as a change in one of its sub-values 
affects the others (Kirkwood, 1997:18).   
Operability is the usability of the hierarchy to the decision maker.  For example, 
in a large military command a value hierarchy should be constructed in a manner such 
that the commander can understand and use it, whether he/she is by specialty an 
operator, a logistician, or acquisitions officer, or a specialist of any other type.   
Finally, the value hierarchy should be as small as possible in order to avoid 
including factors that do not have an impact on the decision.  For example, when 
purchasing an automobile the color may be this kind of factor.  If alternatives are 
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available in all acceptable colors, or perhaps in only one color, it may not be necessary 
to include in the hierarchy (Kirkwood, 1997:19). 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976:41-43) advocate keeping value hierarchies as small as 
possible.  When specifying objectives from the strategic objective downward, 
theoretically the hierarchy could be extended to an “absurd length” by including a sub-
hierarchy for every individual affected by the decision (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976:43).  
In their illustrative example of passenger transportation in the Northeast Corridor, this 
number could reach 50 million people.  Although their example describes an unrealistic 
size for a hierarchy, it does serve to make the point for keeping the size of an actual 
hierarchy manageable.  
This appendix has reviewed the basic principles of VFT.  For more specific 
details the reader is referred to Kirkwood (1997), Keeney (1992), Clemen and Reilly 
(2001), and Keeney and Raiffal (1976). 
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Appendix B.   Preliminary Value Hierarchies Derived from Doctrine Using 
Content Analysis and Affinity Grouping. 
 
To illustrate the values inherent in national security space doctrine, an extended 
excerpt from a technical report completed by Loftis in October 2002 follows.  Within 
this appendix all references to “this study” or “this analysis” refer to the technical 
report, and not to the analysis accomplished described in the main body of the thesis. 
To obtain the values comparable to those that might have been elicited using a 
Silver Standard approach with a panel of experts, content analysis using inductive 
category development was used to collect both explicit and implied objectives from 
three national security space doctrine documents.  Affinity grouping was applied to 
form the first two tiers of the value hierarchies, which were then compared with two 
previous value hierarchies, one of which was accomplished using the Gold Standard 
approach (SPACECAST 2020), with the other using the Silver Standard (ASIIS).  The 
hierarchies extracted from doctrine were intended as preliminary studies, and as such 
were not weighted and only developed through the top two tiers. 
This study led to two conclusions.  First, the analysis method used uncovered 
doctrinal values that retained the capability focus of SPACECAST 2020, such as 
“reduce vulnerability” and “ensure freedom of action in space,” but also values that 
depict how to organize and manage national security space activities, such as “ensure 
unity of command” and “focus diverse national security space activities.”  Further study 
into constructing proxy attributes is recommended in order to capture the organization 
and management values.  The second conclusion is that doctrine now advocates raising 
the profile of national security space activities to the level of the highest national 
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security priorities, as evidenced by “elevate space issues to highest levels” and 
“promulgate space advantages to national security community.”  This represents a 
departure from previous assessments of national security space values, which as 
mentioned previously, have been focused on capabilities.   
 
Problem Statement 
A New Look at the Value of Space 
In January 2001 the Commission to Assess United States National Security 
Space Organization Management and Organization issued its final report, 
recommending sweeping changes in the way the U.S. utilizes space for national 
security purposes.  The scope of the report encompasses all U.S. space activities that 
contribute to national security (hereafter called national security space), including both 
Department of Defense (DOD) activities and other systems that belong to non-DOD 
national agencies.  As many of the changes recommended in the report (hereafter 
referenced as the Space Commission Report) have been implemented, it represents not 
only a shift in thinking with respect to national security space, but also a shift in action.  
The focus of this analysis is to examine systematically the change in national security 
space values after the release of the Space Commission Report, with the result being a 
doctrine-based value model which will provide a backdrop for more conventional 
elicitation from subject matter experts. 
Doctrine presents fundamental principles for the employment of forces (JP-1, 
2000:vi).  It continually evolves as lessons learned over time are incorporated into a 
common frame of reference to give military commanders and their subordinates a 
common frame of reference for conducting operations.  Doctrine “provides the distilled 
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insights and wisdom gained from experience in warfare and other operations requiring 
the use of the military instrument of national power” (JP-1, 2000:I-8).   
With the broad changes recommended by the Space Commission Report taking 
center stage in the space policy arena, a reexamination of what the national leadership 
values from space is in order.  To this end, and to set the stage for further discussion of 
national security space values, three sources of space doctrine were identified for this 
analysis: the Space Commission Report Executive Summary, Joint Doctrine for Space 
Operations (JP 3-14, draft), and Space Operations (AFDD 2-2).  These three 
publications cover space doctrine from the national, joint, and Air Force perspectives, 
respectively.   
Although the Space Commission Report is not doctrine, it was selected for the 
study because of the value implications of the fundamental changes its authors 
recommend for accomplishing the nation’s objectives in space.  As its purpose is to 
assess management and organization of national security space, it does not address the 
full breadth of issues contained in doctrine.  It does, however, specify national-level 
objectives for national security space, including activities outside the Department of 
Defense (Space Commission Report, 2001:2).  The analysis was limited to the 
executive summary of the report. 
Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations (draft) was selected 
due to its status as the highest level of space doctrine within the DOD.  Military 
operations are almost always conducted jointly, and the joint perspective cannot be 
ignored in a study of doctrine, especially when such guidance comes from the highest 
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level of military command.  At the time of this study JP 3-14 (draft) was only available 
in draft form. 
One of the Space Commission’s recommendations was to establish the Air 
Force as the DOD’s executive agent for space, citing the Air Force’s budget authority 
for 85% of national security space assets (Space Commission Report, 2001:55).  As this 
recommendation has been implemented, an examination of official Air Force space 
doctrine was key to this study.  The 1998 version of this doctrine was analyzed, and 
analysis of the recent 2001 version is recommended to complete the picture of national 
security space values. 
The approach of this study is descriptive, not prescriptive.  The intent is not to 
judge the content of doctrine on its merits, but to determine in a systematic manner the 
full set of values expressed in different doctrinal texts, and to compare them with values 
asserted by previous doctrinal texts.  Critical normative judgments about national 
security space values are left to the decision makers themselves. 
The terms doctrinal document and doctrinal text are used in this study to 
include both doctrine stated as such and policy papers from which doctrinal values can 
be extracted.  Additionally, the term national security space is preferred in this study 
over military space to account for the non-military space operations concepts covered 
by the Space Commission Report. 
Previous Efforts to Identify Values Using Doctrine 
Previous approaches to identify values from doctrinal documents include Doyle, 
Deckro, Jackson, and Kloeber (1997), in which fundamental objectives for information 
operations are extracted as they are stated in the documents, and then evaluated for 
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suitability for a value hierarchy.  Their results indicate that no document that by itself 
provided a complete basis for identifying information operations values, “indicating 
that an information warfare value model must be sought outside this context” (Doyle et 
al., 1997:46).   
Another example of identifying values from doctrine comes from Kerchner, 
Deckro, and Kloeber (2001).  In this case a value hierarchy was developed to value 
psychological operations (PSYOPS), with the strategic objective coming from joint 
psychological operations doctrine, and its supporting objectives coming from 
definitions in Army Field Manual 33-1 (Kerchner, Deckro, and Kloeber, 2001:46-47).  
At this point, with the strategic objective and its supporting fundamental objectives 
determined from doctrine, a team of PSYOPS experts developed the remainder of the 
hierarchy.11 
Kloeber (1995) identified values from Army doctrine.  Citing Army Field 
Manual FM 100-5, Airland Battle Doctrine, he developed quantitative measures for the 
five tenets of Army operations: agility, initiative, depth, synchronization, and versatility 
(Kloeber, 1995:12-14).  These tenets (or values) were not necessarily directly 
measured.  For example, one measure of synchronization was “combined arms,” in 
which a variation value was computed in the same fashion as population variance.  The 
data points were the various battlefield operating systems used in an operation.  A high 
variance indicated a “lack of balance among the different combined arms, whereas a 
low variation indicat(ed) a very balanced effort” (Kloeber, 1995:151).   
These studies extract explicitly stated values from doctrine, but no mention of 
implied values is made.  Essentially, the only values identified are the ones that 
                                                 
11 Value hierarchies are explained in greater detail in Appendix A of the thesis. 
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doctrine says are values.  The present study approaches value identification from 
doctrinal documents in a different manner.  The entire basic content of doctrinal 
documents is analyzed for objectives, with the premise that all stated objectives must be 
examined to identify the set of values held by the doctrine’s authors.  As doctrinal 
content is analyzed, values are identified when patterns emerge among the objectives 
extracted.  As the same or similar objectives reappear they can be collected using the 
affinity grouping process, and structured into a hierarchy using value-focused thinking 
(VFT) concepts.  Focusing on objectives directed by doctrine, the analysis excluded 
supplementary portions of doctrine such as appendices that merely serve to support the 
main text. 
Doyle et al. (1997) did not have the advantage of an existing value hierarchy for 
information warfare with which to compare their results.  Such a hierarchy for national 
security space does exist in the form of the operational analysis for SPACECAST 2020, 
a 1994 study directed by the chief of staff of the Air Force (CSAF) to “identify and 
conceptually develop high-leverage space technologies and systems that will best 
support the warfighter in the twenty-first century” (SPACECAST 2020 Operational 
Analysis, 1994).   
Drawing heavily on draft joint doctrine, a team of experts was assembled to 
develop a quantitative method of assessing new systems concepts and technologies for 
their value in meeting anticipated requirements of the warfighter.  As a starting point 
values were extracted from the four basic types of space operations listed in JP 3-14 
(draft, 1994): force application, force enhancement, space control, and space support.  
Using this top-down approach the SPACECAST 2020 team then decomposed these 
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four first-tier values into progressively more detailed sub-values until they arrived at 
qualities that could be measured (SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis, 1994).  
Doctrine was used in this case as a launching pad for an effort to identify the attributes 
that measure the value of national security space activities; however, there was no focus 
on the doctrine itself.   
Without extracting values from doctrine in such a manner that they are 
established to be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, it is possible that the 
values will overlap (e.g., Space Support may not be exclusive of Force Enhancement).  
It is also possible that they may not cover all of the guidance contained in space 
doctrine (e.g., insights about organization of space forces may be missed).  To illustrate 
this point, the SPACECAST 2020 value model will be presented later in this study as a 
reference against which the value models extracted from space doctrine will be 
compared. 
The Aerospace Integrated Investment Study (ASIIS) was accomplished in 1999 
as a joint effort between Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Force Space Command 
(AFSPC) to provide an integrated framework for air and space force modernization 
analysis, as well as to help each command develop its own internal investment plan 
(Scitor and ANSER, 1999:35).  The value model for this analysis was derived from a 
draft version of Air Force Vision 2015 (Lehmkuhl and Tedeschi, 2000), and was 
tailored from its original ASIIS form to one that specifically captured AFPSC’s values 
by deleting those values not relevant to AFSPC (Lehmkuhl, 1999).  The model was 
used to facilitate trade-off decisions for air and space integration studies (Scitor and 
ANSER, 1999:34-35), and clarified several measures used in AFSPC’s previous model 
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used for mission area assessment (MAA).  This value model, called the AeroSpace 
Investment Model (AIM), will be presented below as a reference for comparison with 
the space doctrine hierarchies. 
The focus of this study is to identify all the values that national security space 
doctrine.  The approach taken borrows from both the Gold Standard and the Silver 
Standard methods.  By using a systematic method that encompasses the entire 
document, a complete picture of what doctrine says is important is formed that includes 
not only operational capabilities such as those listed in SPACECAST 2020, but other 
concepts that have traditionally received less focus, due to the intent of previous 
studies.  For example, some of draft JP 3-14 addresses command relationships of space 
forces under various conditions (draft JP 3-14, 2001:III-1 to III-2); this aspect was 
missed with the top-down approach of SPACECAST 2020 that started the value 
hierarchy with the four types of space operations.  A systematic approach that addresses 
the whole message of space doctrine is needed to ensure both stated and implied values 
are identified.  The systematic approach this study integrates concepts from content 
analysis to identify objectives, affinity grouping to aggregate them into values, and 
Value-Focused Thinking to build a value model. 
 
Methodology 
Application of Content Analysis 
Objectives are often directly stated or implied in organizational directives, 
policies, and, as this and many other studies have shown, doctrine.  These documents 
provide in written form directions toward accomplishment of objectives.  It is the 
premise of this study that the content of directive documents can be systematically 
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analyzed in order to elicit values from stated objectives.  This study is intended to be a 
preliminary assessment of military space values, and the results herein will be most 
useful as a springboard to direct elicitation from an actual. 
Content analysis dates back at least to eighteenth century Sweden, where it was 
used to settle a religious controversy over whether a collection of songs carried 
dangerous and dissentious ideas (Krippendorff, 1980:13).  By the twentieth century it 
had evolved into a discipline and was applied in the fields of psychology, sociology, 
and political science.  The arrival of computerized data processing in the 1950’s made it 
easy to accomplish the repetitive processes of coding and quantifying textual content.  
Krippendorff has concluded that “content analysis has evolved into a scientific method 
that promises to yield inferences from essentially verbal, symbolic, or communicative 
data.” (Krippendorff, 1980:20). 
According to Weber, content analysis can be used to make inferences from text; 
he lists among its uses “(to) reveal the focus of individual, group, institutional, or 
societal attention” (Weber, 1990:9).  This study will show that by uncovering the focus 
of institutional attention of a doctrinal text in a systematic manner by identifying 
objectives, the doctrine’s values can be inferred, and can form the basis of a value 
hierarchy that can be used as an organizational decision-making tool. 
Weber lists the following eight steps for creating a coding scheme for analyzing 
a text for content (Weber, 1990:21-24): 
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1. Define the recording units 
2. Define the categories 
3. Test coding on a sample of text 
4. Assess accuracy or reliability 
5. Revise the coding rules 
6. Return to Step 3 (until the desired reliability has been achieved) 
7. Code all the text 
8. Assess achieved reliability or accuracy 
 
These steps represent the ideal case where more than one human is available to code 
text.  Due to manpower constraints and the preliminary nature of this study, some of 
these steps will be limited in their application.  Where possible the impact of these 
limitations on the reliability of the study will be addressed. 
1. Define the recording units.  Weber lists the possible units of a text to be 
analyzed to include individual words, word senses, sentences, themes, paragraphs, or 
even the whole text, depending on the objective of the study and reliability required 
(Weber, 1990:21-23).  Coding by individual word was eliminated primarily due to the 
labor-intensive effort required and its narrow scope with respect to identifying 
objectives.  For example, the words “inception,” “is,” or “competent” by themselves do 
not indicate objectives, but require more specificity.  The multiplicity of word 
meanings (the word “have” by itself can mean “possess” or be used to indicate the 
present perfect tense of a verb) and time limitations also eliminate coding by individual 
word.12  Coding by word senses (the same as coding by word, but accounting for 
multiple meanings) was eliminated for the same reasons.  Coding by sentence was 
eliminated not because of its inadequacy in capturing an objective, but because a 
sentence may contain more than one objective.   
                                                 
12 Using computer software designed for content analysis would alleviate this burden, and its use is 
recommended for further study.  Possible implications of this method include limitations on a computer’s 
detection of meaning, much as spellcheckers in word processing software are limited in their ability to 
gauge word usage. 
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Krippendorff identifies units of analysis as physical, syntactical, referential, 
propositional (and kernels), and thematic (Krippendorff, 1980:60-62).  Physical units 
are pages, issues of a newspaper, posters, and in the case of non-textual media, even 
frames of film and units of broadcast time.  No physical unit within doctrinal 
documents is available as a candidate for identifying objectives.  Syntactical units and 
items are those that are “natural” relative to the grammar of the communications 
medium, and do not require judgments of meaning.  These are excluded from 
consideration due to the judgment of meaning required to identify objectives.  
Objectives may not appear “naturally” in doctrinal text; some interpretation may be 
required to determine if a word or phrase directs action toward an objective or merely 
sets up the context for an objective mentioned elsewhere.  Referential units are used to 
account for the various ways a particular object, event, person, act, country, or idea may 
be mentioned (or referenced) in a text (e.g., interpreting Prohibition, the Eighteenth 
Amendment, and Volstead Act as meaning the same thing).  This type of unit would be 
appropriate if one particular objective were under analysis, but the intent here is to 
identify different objectives.  Propositional units (and kernels) are required to possess a 
certain structure or set of structures such as 
subject/verb/object 
 
Objectives in doctrinal text may have different structures, so restricting the analysis to 
one specific structure or a set of structures runs the risk of missing those objectives 
expressed in other forms.  
As previously discussed, values are specified by objectives, and as stated above, 
most coding units are too cumbersome or restrictive to capture objectives.  The 
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thematic unit described by Krippendorff, however, does allow for the judgment of 
meaning required to identify objectives, and it best fits the purposes of this study.  
Thematic units are  
…identified by their correspondence to a particular structural definition of the 
content of narratives, explanations, or interpretations.  They are distinguished 
from each other on conceptual grounds and are contrasted with the remaining 
portion of irrelevant material by their possessing the desired structural 
properties (Krippendorff, 1980: 62-63). 
 
The conceptual ground on which this study distinguishes thematic units is the question 
of whether or not a portion of text contains language that directs action toward an 
objective.  If a portion of text directs or recommends action, then it is interpreted as an 
objective.  It is then selected as a data point for analysis.  In this manner the objectives 
are identified for separating into categories as described below. 
The objective-oriented language found in this study most often took the form of 
a phrase containing an action verb, as the following example from the Space 
Commission report shows: 
 
Because of space capabilities the US is better able to sustain and extend 
deterrence to allies and friends in our highly complex international environment. 
(Space Commission Report, 2001:11) 
 
Here the objective stated in the text is “sustain and extend deterrence,” and this 
objective is the data point for analysis.  The remainder of the sentence describes the 
context for sustaining and extending deterrence — the US is the actor sustaining and 
extending deterrence, it is only to be extended to “allies and friends,” the reason is our 
space capabilities, and the setting is “our highly complex international environment.”  
Decision alternatives aimed at satisfying the objectives of sustaining and extending 
deterrence must fit within the bounds of the decision context: the US must be the actor, 
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they must use space capabilities, allies and friends must be able to benefit from 
deterrence, and the alternative must be workable in a highly complex international 
environment. 
 
2.  Define the categories.  The categories into which qualifying text falls are the values 
implied by the objectives.  Weber describes constructing a set of content categories on 
the basis of a single concept (Weber, 1990:24), with the advantages being “intensive 
and detailed analysis of a single theoretical construct,” and providing “an explicit 
rationale not only for what is retained, but also for what is excluded from the analysis.”  
In this study the single theoretical construct is the objective, and the categories are the 
values implied therein.  Affinity grouping was used to delineate the separate values into 
a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive set. 
This study identifies categories as the relationships between objective phrases 
emerge.  Mayring (2000) terms this procedure inductive category development.  He 
summarizes it as follows: 
The main idea of the procedure is, to formulate a criterion of definition, derived 
from theoretical background and research question, which determines the 
aspects of the textual material taken into account. Following this criterion the 
material is worked through and categories are tentative and step-by-step 
deduced. Within a feedback loop those categories are revised, eventually 
reduced to main categories and checked in respect to their reliability. If the 
research question suggests quantitative aspects (e.g. frequencies of coded 
categories) can be analyzed (Mayring, 2000: paragraph 12). 
 
In this study the research question defines the criterion of definition as language that 
directs action toward an objective, and the categories (the particular values) are not 
determined ahead of time but arise in the course of the analysis of the text.  The 
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categories were revised and reduced during the affinity grouping process (described 
below). 
3.  Test coding on a sample of text.  To ensure that the scheme is practical for 
the purposes of the study, a small sample of the text should be coded before applying 
the scheme to the entire text.  The following sample from the Space Commission Report 
tests the scheme: 
 
Advance US Tech Leadership 
 
To achieve NS objectives, and compete successfully internationally, US must 
maintain technological leadership in space.  This requires a healthy industrial 
base, improved S&T resources, an attitude of risk-taking and innovation, and 
government policies that support international competitiveness.  In particular, 
the government needs to significantly increase investment in breakthrough 
technologies to fuel revolutionary capabilities.  Mastery of space also requires 
new approaches that reduce significantly the cost of building and launching 
space systems.  Box: The US will not remain world’s leading space-faring 
nation by relying on yesterday’s technology to meet today’s requirements at 
tomorrow’s prices. 
 
In Table 11 an example of the coding decisions is shown: 
 
Table 11. Testing Coding Scheme on a Sample of Text. 
Objective Phrases (data points) Context 
achieve NS objectives  
compete successfully internationally   
maintain technological leadership in space 
requires  
a healthy industrial base,   
improved S&T resources,   
an attitude of risk-taking and innovation  
support international competitiveness.   government policies 
significantly increase investment in breakthrough technologies 
fuel revolutionary capabilities  
mastery of space  
requires new approaches  
reduce significantly the cost of building and launching space systems 
(In box outside text) 
remain world’s leading space-faring nation 
US 
not rely on yesterday’s technology 
meet today’s requirements 
(not) at tomorrow’s prices 
 
NS = national security  S&T = science and technology 
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Some questions arise when extracting objectives from this sample.  Where do 
the adverbs fall, with the objective or in the context?  Should the second objective be 
listed as “compete,” “compete successfully,” “compete internationally,” or “compete 
successfully internationally?”  Although the argument can be made that only the verb 
directs action and the adverbs merely modify the verb, including the adverb in the 
objective phrase specifies the objective more clearly, and allows for grouping with 
other verbs that fall into the same context when forming the hierarchy.13  This places 
the probability of error on the side of identifying some objectives too narrowly, as 
opposed to missing them altogether.  If an objective is identified too narrowly, the 
affinity grouping process will aggregate it back into its broader context. 
The context for an action can be presented in negative terms, such as in the last 
sentence in the sample text.  In this case the word “not” was added in parentheses to the 
context, even though it appeared in text coded as an objective.  Following the same 
rationale as when keeping adverbs in order to retain context, the original meaning of the 
text is retained. 
According to the scheme, the recording unit for this analysis was language that 
directs action toward an objective.  The remainder of the text describes a decision 
context, or scope of appropriateness for potential alternatives in a decision situation.  
This study focuses on the values implied by the objectives, and, in accordance with the 
single theoretical construct described above, are excluded from analysis. 
4.  Assess accuracy or reliability.  Weber identifies three forms of reliability 
pertinent to content analysis: stability, reproducibility, and accuracy (Weber, 1990: 17).  
                                                 
13 Using the affinity grouping process to categorize objective phrases into values is explained in the 
section entitled “Inductive Category Development Using Affinity Grouping” on p. 25. 
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Stability refers to the consistency achieved by the same coder coding the text multiple 
times.  This study did not test for stability due to time constraints.  Reproducibility (also 
called inter-coder reliability) refers to the consistency of results obtained by multiple 
human coders.  As this study only used one coder, reproducibility is assumed, as 
objective phrases can readily be separated from the rest of the text.  Accuracy refers to 
consistency of coding against a recognized norm or standard.  In this case the standard 
to be used is the objective phrase, identifiable by a verb that directs action accompanied 
by adverbs and objects that specify the context of the objective.   
Deciding whether a portion of text describes an objective or a decision context 
is, of course, subject to the coder’s interpretation.  There is no way to avoid differences 
in human interpretation of words, but using more than one coder, each working 
independently, would be a way to narrow this bias to within an acceptable tolerance of 
commonly held meanings.  Weber notes this problem in estimating reliability, and 
recommends that disagreements between coders be resolved only after the reliability of 
the process has been estimated (Weber, 1990:23).  The reliability of this study would be 
increased by using more than one human coder.  Due to the preliminary nature of the 
study and manpower limitations, however, this was not practical.  As the purpose of the 
study was to identify candidates for space doctrine values to augment elicitation by 
structured discussion, the effect of the absence of reliability testing is noted, but 
assumed not to affect the results in a manner inconsistent with this purpose.  It is 
assumed in this study that another analyst coding the same texts using the same unit of 
analysis (the objective phrase) under the coding scheme defined above would be able to 
differentiate between portions of text that specify objectives and those that do not.  
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Another study by a different analyst using the same methodology would verify whether 
or not an acceptable degree of accuracy has been obtained. 
5.  Revise the coding rules.  This step applies when the desired level of 
reliability is not attained.  Readers of this report interested in doing their own analysis 
of space doctrine are invited to verify the results from this one in order to validate the 
coding scheme.  Additional analyses of the topic and comparison of results with those 
presented in this report will improve the reliability of this analysis and its methodology. 
6.  Return to Step 3.  This step applies until the desired level of reliability is 
attained. 
7.  Code all the text.  Every objective phrase identified by the coding scheme is 
then extracted for the affinity grouping process described below. 
8.  Assess achieved reliability or accuracy.  As mentioned in Step 4, if this 
study were to be done using multiple human coders, resolution of any disagreements 
between them would wait until all the text is coded.  This prevents human collaboration 
from masking weaknesses or inconsistencies in the rules themselves.  Verification of 
the reliability of this methodology by other analysts is invited. 
Krippendorff acknowledges the subjectivity inherent in content analysis when 
he notes “how categories are defined…is an art.  Little is written about it.” 
(Krippendorff, 1980:76).  The subjectivity addressed by Krippendorff does not 
diminish the results of this study, as its purpose is to use space doctrine values as a 
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springboard for interactive value elicitation from “real-world” decision makers in the 
national security space community, which itself will have a subjective component. 14 
Inductive Category Development Using Affinity Grouping. 
Forming categories as they emerge as the analysis proceeds is the textual analog 
of the affinity grouping procedure, which gathers and categorizes ideas that emerge 
during group brainstorming sessions.  This method of systematically grouping data into 
categories was developed by the Japanese anthropologist Jiro Kawakita, who used it to 
assemble large volumes of detailed notes into categories by observing the patterns that 
emerged from them (Brassard, 1989:18).   
Affinity grouping was used for the Foundations 2025 model in AF 2025 
(Parnell, Conley, Jackson, Lehmkuhl, and Andrew, 1998:1340-1344).  The strategic 
objective15 was taken from the CSAF’s original charge to the participants, “achieve air 
and space dominance.”  To obtain the objectives for the value hierarchy, the 
participants were asked to identify tasks that supported the strategic objective and to 
state them in the form of key action verbs (Parnell et al., 1998:1340).  Verbs were 
isolated from nouns to the greatest extent possible to avoid institutional bias.  The verbs 
were then aggregated into tasks by grouping related verbs together, thus encouraging 
mutual exclusivity (Parnell et al., 1998:1341).  The tasks, some of which were 
decomposed into subtasks, formed the base level of the hierarchy.  They were then 
structured into a value hierarchy by applying the affinity grouping process again, 
resulting in functions (awareness, reach, and power) that supported the strategic 
                                                 
14 To address the subjectivity of the single human coder (the author of this report), a brief description of 
this coder’s experience is in order.  The coder is an engineering graduate with some recent graduate-level 
public administration study, and has served as a missile launch officer and missile procedures instructor. 
15 Parnell et al. (1998) term this the “overarching objective.” 
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objective, “achieve air and space dominance.”  This analysis of national security space 
doctrine followed a similar methodology, except that objective phrases containing 
action verbs were used in place of the tasks identified by the AF 2025 participants. 
Brassard defines the Affinity Diagram tool as follows: 
This tool gathers large amounts of language data (ideas, opinions, issues, etc. 
(sic)), and organizes it into groupings based on the natural relationship between 
each item, and defines groups of items.  It is largely a creative rather than a 
logical process (Brassard, 1989:17). 
 
A group brainstorming setting is an open system in which new ideas enter by 
harnessing the creativity of more than one participant.  In this open system the intent is 
to generate new alternatives.  In this study the system is limited to the text and the 
coder, whose input is limited to what is observed in the text, in a fashion similar to Jiro 
Kawakita’s original process. 
Brassard lists seven steps in creating an affinity diagram (Brassard, 1989:20-
33): 
1. Assemble the right team 
2. Phrase the issue to be considered 
3. Generate and record ideas 
4. Display the complete cards 
5. Arrange the cards into related groupings 
6. Create the header cards 
7. Draw the “finished” affinity diagram 
 
1.  Assemble the right team.  Brassard states that a team must have the 
“necessary knowledge to uncover the various dimensions of the issue” (Brassard, 1989: 
20).  His intent here is to have as many different perspectives as possible in order to 
spur the creation of many ideas.  Although this study is not aimed at generating new 
ideas, but at identifying those already stated in text, the convergence of results obtained 
 
   85
by multiple coders would more accurately capture values within an acceptable tolerance 
of commonly held meanings.  For reasons mentioned above, this study uses a team of 
one. 
2.  Phrase the issue to be considered.  At this stage in the study the issue to be 
considered is whether a portion of text contains language that directs action toward an 
objective.   
3.  Generate and record ideas.  Brassard characterizes this as a brainstorming 
step.  Although this is a study of a closed system, the idea of gathering and recording 
disparate pieces of information still applies.  The goal is to dissect the material into 
movable elements that can be rearranged as logical patterns emerge. 
Brassard recommends recording the emergent ideas onto cards for team access 
and mobility.  Although this study does not use cards, the reference to cards in the 
remainder of the steps is left to retain fidelity to Brassard’s explanation. 
4.  Display the completed cards.  The cards to which Brassard refers are used so 
all team members can have access to the ideas generated.  In this one-coder study a 
computer is used, and physical mobility is not an issue.  In a multiple-coder study this 
step would be valuable at Step 8 of Weber’s method for creating and testing a coding 
scheme. 
5.  Arrange the cards into related groupings.  This procedure is largely the same 
as Step 2 in Weber’s process and in Mayring’s summary of inductive category 
development.  Brassard prefers the term groupings to categories to encourage 
flexibility in the team’s thinking, but this study will ignore the distinction. 
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6.  Creating the header cards.  Brassard’s header cards “capture(s) the central 
idea that ties all of the cards together” (Brassard, 1989:31).  In this study these are the 
initial objectives that will be subjected to the WITI test in order to identify values. 
7.  Drawing the “finished” affinity diagram.  This step finalizes the affinity 
process.  Brassard mentions “superheaders” that may be necessary to tie together 
related groupings (Brassard, 1989:33).  In this study the analog is the WITI test — if 
two groupings appear to be related they may support the same value.  Mutual 
exclusivity must be enforced, and if the groupings are not mutually exclusive, then the 
process should be repeated until mutual exclusivity is attained.  An example of a 
“finished” affinity diagram for the value “Reduce Vulnerability” can be found in Figure 
14 below. 
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Collect Intelligence 
Deter Hostile Acts 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintain intelligence capabilities 
Collect(ing) intelligence from space 
Collect information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deter evolving threats 
Avoid space Pearl Harbor 
Pursue deterrence objectives successfully 
Deter hostile acts in, from space 
Sustain deterrence to allies, friends 
Extend deterrence to allies, friends 
Deter threats 
Extend deterrence concepts 
Deter against hostile acts 
Deter attack 
Bolster deterrent effect 
Deter attack on US interests 
Deter hostile actions 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Illustrative example of affinity grouping using objective phrases from 
the Space Commission Report.  Objective phrases were identified and grouped together to form 
values on the basis of related meanings.  These values were then grouped to form the value “Reduce 
Vulnerability.”  Some of the groups of values may be decomposed further, e.g., separate “defend interests 
in space” and “defend interests from space,” (underlined in figure). 
Better understand intentions 
Better understand motivations  
Better understand capabilities 
Take seriously the possibility of attack  
US vulnerability reduced 
Effects of surprise attack are limited 
(Failure to) develop credible threat analyses 
Provide timely, accurate estimates of threats 
Defend space assets against hostile acts 
Negate hostile use  
Defend against attacks 
Defend against hostile acts in, from space 
Pursue defense objectives successfully 
Defend against evolving threats 
Protecting peaceful use of space 
Extend defense capabilities 
Defend against hostile acts 
Defend assets in orbit 
Overcome their efforts to deny 
Protect rights of nations 
Defend interests in, from space 
Defend US interests 
Defend against hostile actions 
Defend Against Hostile Acts
Understand Threats 
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Summary of Methodology 
The content analysis the national security space doctrines analyzed in this report 
used objective phrases as coding units.  These phrases were then affinity-grouped to 
form the upper levels of a value hierarchy for each.  From these values the overarching 
strategic objective for each doctrine was inferred by applying the WITI test.  The 
hierarchies that were extracted from doctrine were then compared with the existing 
value hierarchy from SPACECAST 2020 and the ASIIS study to illustrate how the 
values by which we measure space as a national security asset have changed. 
 
Extracted Hierarchies  
The extracted hierarchies for each doctrine are presented below, followed by the 
hierarchies from the SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis and ASIIS.  The 
extracted hierarchies identified values two tiers deep, with the overarching strategic 
objectives inferred from the first tier of values.  These values set the stage for 
identifying more specific values for the lower tiers of the hierarchies and developing 
quantifiable attributes to support them.  The ideal method to accomplish this would be 
to discuss the meanings of the objective phrases with their authors, thus providing a 
validation mechanism for the study.  Absent this possibility, national security space 
users and stakeholders are candidates for developing the remainder of the hierarchies.  
Depending on whether users and stakeholders fall under the aegis of national, joint, or 
Air Force space, the appropriate hierarchy (Space Commission, JP 3-14 (draft), or 
AFDD 2-2, respectively) should be selected for completion. 
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Space Commission Report 
The decision context of the Space Commission Report Executive Summary was 
the “organization and management of space activities that support U.S. national 
security interests” (Space Commission Report:2).  This produced a broader overarching 
strategic objective than was found in strict military doctrine.  The strategic objective 
supported by the first tier of values is to “realize U.S. interests in space.”   
The broad national scope and focus on organization suggest great complexity in 
defining measures of merit at the basic level of the hierarchy.  Unlike the SPACECAST 
2020 Operational Analysis hierarchy, which was constructed over a span of four weeks 
and required a “a broad selection of students and faculty from the Air Force Institute of 
Technology, the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air War College, and Air 
Command and Staff College,” (SPACECAST 2020, 1994) a fully enumerated value 
model for all of national security space would require input from the leadership of 
every national agency with an interest in space.  The Space Commission Report 
suggests there are seven Cabinet-level departments, five Senate committees, six House 
committees, and a multitude of agencies (Space Commission Report, 2001:3).  The 
difficulty inherent in assembling such large number of government decision makers for 
direct value elicitation argues strongly in favor of doctrinal document analysis as a 
method of extracting national security space values.  The model constructed recognizes 
this difficulty, as illustrated by the value “Execute space development” which contains 
the sub-value “Focus diverse national security space elements.”  When the base level of 
the hierarchy is developed, proxy attributes may bridge across their various 
perspectives to reconcile the differences arising from the diversity of stakeholders.   
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The hierarchy and definitions of values derived from analysis of the 386 objective 
phrases in the report are presented in Figure 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Value Hierarchy Derived from Space Commission Report Executive 
Summary (January 2001). 
 
 
Realize U.S. interests in space 
Provide space support 
to highest-level 
decision-makers 
Execute space 
development 
Reduce vulnerability Realign space 
thinking 
Elevate space 
issues to highest 
government levels 
Change 
organizational 
structure 
Receive guidance 
from POTUS  
Collect intelligence 
 
Understand threats 
Deter hostile acts 
Defend against 
hostile acts 
Create favorable 
environment 
Develop space 
expertise 
Focus diverse 
national security 
space efforts
Support national 
civilian leadership 
Support national 
military leadership 
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Definition of Space Commission Report Values 
Provide Space Support to Highest-Level Decision-Makers: 
Support national civilian leadership — Ensure the President has resources required to 
manage crises and conflicts. 
Support national military leadership — Provide space-related services to augment air, 
land, and sea forces in support of military operations. 
 
Execute Space Development: 
Create favorable environment — Encourage a risk-taking culture of innovation and a 
friendly legal and regulatory environment with friendly “rules of the road” for 
developing space expertise. 
Develop space expertise — Create and sustain a cadre of space professionals, and 
incorporate their expertise into new doctrine. 
Focus diverse national security space efforts — Promptly merge disparate U.S. space 
activities. 
 
Reduce Vulnerability: 
Collect intelligence — Gather information on potential sources of vulnerability. 
Understand threats — Analyze information collected to provide a better understanding 
of vulnerability. 
Deter hostile acts — Deter actions hostile to U.S. interests.  
Defend against hostile acts — Defend against hostile acts directed against U.S. 
interests. 
 
Realign Space Thinking: 
Elevate Space Issues to Highest Government Levels — Position and fund U.S.space 
organizations so that space activities are given attention commensurate with 
their importance. 
Change Organizational Structure — Streamline U.S. government offices to improve 
management and oversight of space programs. 
Receive Guidance from the President — Follow Presidential direction and guidance in 
setting the course for national security space programs. 
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JP 3-14 (draft) 
The value hierarchy extracted from the 604 objective phrases of Joint 
Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations (draft, 2001) is shown in Figure 
16.  Two of the values refer to operations in space: “provide responsive support to 
supported CINC” and “optimize space resource usage.”  These appear to lend 
themselves to more measurable decomposition than the other two, “organize for space 
operations” and “articulate the contribution of space,” which are more conceptual in 
nature.  Thus, the model for joint space doctrine shows that the joint doctrine authors 
emphasize quantification of space values more than the Space Commission did, but did 
not carry it as far the authors of SPACECAST 2020.  The differing decision contexts 
(technological vs. organizational/managerial) account for the differential emphasis on 
quantification.  As with the hierarchy for the Space Commission Report, when the base 
level of the hierarchy is developed, proxy attributes may be an accurate measure of the 
conceptual values. 
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Figure 16. Value Hierarchy Derived from Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space 
Operations (draft) (April 2001). 
 
Definition of JP 3-14 (draft) Values 
Provide Responsive Support to Supported Theater Commander 
Achieve desired operational effects on the enemy — Use space capabilities to deceive, 
disrupt, deny, degrade, and destroy as necessary to remove any enemy 
advantage from space. 
Ensure freedom of action in space — Operate space systems toward the goal of 
protecting space interests and gaining space superiority. 
Achieve dominant battlespace awareness — Collect information, understand the 
situation, predict hostile actions, and disseminate information throughout the 
commander’s theater. 
 
Organize for Space Operations: 
Refine decision-making processes — Establish requirements and priorities, reduce 
decision time, and codify insights so that decision-making processes are 
organized for support of space operations. 
Ensure unity of command — Ensure clear designation of supported and supporting 
CINC, along with clear rules for designating command and control authority of 
space assets 
Integrate space capabilities into planning and operations — Integrate all space 
capabilities (military, national, civil, commercial, and allied), the means for 
their protection, their supporting industrial base, and National Guard and 
Reserve space components into all facets of strategy, doctrine, education, 
training, exercises, operations of US military forces. 
Accomplish the nation’s military 
space objectives 
Provide responsive 
support to supported 
CINC 
Organize for space 
operations 
Optimize space 
resource usage 
Articulate the 
contribution of space
Achieve desired 
operational effects 
on enemy 
Ensure freedom of 
action in space 
Achieve dominant 
battlespace 
awareness 
Refine decision-
making process 
Ensure unity of 
command 
Integrate space 
capabilities into 
planning and operations
Conserve available 
resources 
Maximize effect on 
adversary 
Minimize effect on 
non-adversaries 
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Optimize Space Resource Usage: 
Conserve available resources — Reduce the number and type of forces needed to 
achieve military objectives. 
Maximize effect on adversary — Maximize the effect of weapons on the adversary 
throughout the battlespace. 
Minimize effect on non-adversaries — Minimize the effect of weapons on non-
adversaries throughout the battlespace. 
 
Articulate the Contribution of Space: 
Examine and describe the role of space forces in accomplishing military 
objectives by identifying space as a center of gravity and considering space in 
development of courses of action.
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AFDD 2-2 (1998) 
 
As this analysis continues into Air Force-specific doctrine, it reveals a mix of 
conceptual and quantifiable values similar to the doctrinal texts examined previously.  
The more easily quantified values parallel some of those in the SPACECAST 2020 
hierarchy, with “surveillance” appearing in each at the sub-value level, and “reduce 
adversary’s benefit from space” in AFDD 2-2 being almost the same as “negation” in 
SPACECAST 2020.  As with the Space Commission Report and JP 3-14 (draft), proxy 
attributes for less directly quantifiable values such as “Reach Out to Joint 
Force/National Leadership/Civil Sector” may be the best means to measure what they 
represent.  The value hierarchy extracted from the 312 objective phrases of Air Force 
Doctrine Document 2-2, Space Operations is shown below in Figure 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.  Value Hierarchy Derived from AFDD 2-2. Space Operations (August 
1998). 
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Definition of AFDD 2-2 Values 
Operate Freely in Space: 
Gain Space Superiority — Gain control of activities conducted in and through the space 
environment. 
Maintain Space Superiority — Maintain control of activities conducted in and through 
the space environment. 
 
Induce Effects on Adversary: 
Reduce Adversary’s Benefit from Space — Use lethal, nonlethal means to achieve five 
major effects on adversary: deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and 
destruction. 
Control Decision Cycle — Increase friendly forces’ ability to detect, plan, and react 
faster than adversary. 
 
Provide Superior Global Situational Awareness : 
Surveillance — Maintain a continuous, instantaneous presence over enemy territory not 
available from terrestrial-based forces. 
Detection — Detect enemy space and missile forces, and any alterations in the space 
environment. 
Interpret Data — Identify enemy space and missile forces, and characterize the space 
threat environment. 
Disseminate Information — Provide critical information essential to NCA (sic) 
decision process in determining response to attack 
 
Pursue Space Capabilities 
Realize Unique Advantages of Space — Use space systems to full advantage to provide 
unlimited range, rapid deployability, and unprecedented accuracy to friendly 
forces. 
Complement Air Capabilities — Leverage space and air capabilities to attain air 
superiority early in the campaign. 
Expand Breadth of Alternative Capabilities — Plan for use of civil, commercial, and 
allied space systems to support multipurpose operations in the space medium. 
 
Promulgate Space Advantages to National Security Community 
Reach Out to Joint Force — Augment DOD space sys in order to enhance lethality, 
precision, and agility of combat forces. 
Reach Out to National Leadership — Employ multipurpose space systems as national 
policy dictates to give our national leaders the presence and war-fighting 
options needed for power projection. 
Reach Out to Civil Sector — provide essential support and expertise to civil sector 
agencies performing combat, noncombat MOOTW. 
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At this point, the values identified from space doctrine are candidates to be 
broken down into quantifiable measures, as was done in the ASIIS study and in Kloeber 
(1995).  To this end, interactive values elicitation with the decision makers and 
stakeholders through structured interviews would be the ideal method of identifying the 
quantifiable attributes needed to measure the value of national security space activities.   
SPACECAST 2020 
The value hierarchy constructed by the participants in SPACECAST 2020 used 
the types of space operations and their corresponding capabilities from the 1994 version 
of JP 3-14 (draft) as a starting point (SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis, 1994).  
The SPACECAST 2020 participants then decomposed these values into quantifiable 
attributes.  Because of its use of both doctrine and interactive solicitation from experts, 
this hierarchy was selected as a basis of comparison with the value hierarchies extracted 
from current space doctrine. 
As the decision context for SPACECAST 2020 was “to quantify and compare 
different systems' contributions to various space capabilities,” (SPACECAST 2020 
Operational Analysis:1), each value was decomposed into its sub-values and sub-sub-
values before quantitative measures of merit were identified.  For example, within the 
value Force Enhancement is the sub-value Communications, and it is broken down as 
follows in Table 12: 
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Table 12.  Values and Weighting for the Force Enhancement Value in the 
SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis Hierarchy. 
 
   Line  Current Minor Significant Order of  
OVERALL OBJECTIVE:  Control and 
Exploit Space 
Item  Level Improvem
ent 
Improvement Magnitude 
    No. Measure of 
Merit 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.5) (0.9) 
 Crisis availability 0.35 1 Initial # links in 
theater 
about 10 25 100 1000's 
Commun
ications 
Capacity 0.35 2 Decompressed 
MB/sec 
300 
Mbits/sec/l
ink 
600 1000 3000 
0.22 Interoperability 0.20 3 Common-use 
systems 
Little All AF 
systems 
All US 
systems 
US, 
commercial, 
intl. 
Force 
Enhance- 
ment 
0.37 
 Security 0.10 4 Level of secure 
links 
Corps Division Battalion Platoon 
From SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis, Appendix 1. 
 
As the study of doctrinal text values only identified the first two tiers under the 
overarching strategic objective, only the first two tiers of the SPACECAST 2020 model 
are shown below in Figure 6. 
The full hierarchy is displayed in Sub-Appendix 1.  In Figure 17 below the top 
two tiers and the overarching strategic objective of the SPACECAST 2020 value 
hierarchy are presented. 
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Figure 18.  SPACECAST 2020 Operation Analysis Value Hierarchy (top two levels 
changed from table format to hierarchy format). 
 
 
 
AeroSpace Integrated Investment Study (ASIIS) 
The ASIIS produced the Aerospace Investment Model (AIM) for Fiscal Year 
2004.  The overarching strategic objective, Vigilance, Reach, and Power, was taken 
from the Air Force Strategic Vision from Fall Corona ’99 (Lehmkuhl, 1999), and the 
first tier of values consisted of the following: Inform, Enable, Act.  These and their sub-
Control and Exploit Space 
Force Enhancement Force Application 
Ballistic Missile 
Defense 
Power Projection 
Air, Land and Sea 
Defense from Space
Space Control Space Support 
Surveillance 
Protection 
Negation 
Launch/Lift 
Satellite Control 
Logistics of System 
Warning, 
Processing, and 
Dissemination 
Communications 
Intelligence and 
Surveillance 
Navigation and 
Positioning 
Environmental 
Monitoring and 
Control 
Mapping, Charting, 
and Geodesy 
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values touch on some of the less directly quantifiable values such as those shown in 
Table 13: 
 
Table 13. Examples of Proxy Attributes from AIM. 
Bottom-tier Value Example of “Soft” Attribute 
Inform — Command and Control — Maintain 
Common Operational Picture 
Adequacy of Command Picture — Rating of 
completeness of information by key operators 
in the command and control chain 
Inform — Command and Control — Develop 
Plans 
Responsiveness of Plans Developed — Rating by 
development personnel as to the degree of 
responsiveness of the products they produce 
to create accurate command pictures 
Inform — Command and Control — Execute 
Plans 
Plan Execution Capacity — Percent plans of 
interest that can be coordinated at a command level 
Enable — Prepare-Train-Space Operations — 
Missile Operators 
Level of Impact of Evaluations on Systems — 
Level of impacts to missile operators from tests 
and evaluations 
Act — Mission Planning- Missile Operations  Wartime Scenario Support — The percentage of 
wartime scenarios that can be adequately planned 
within 3 hours.  Adequate planning will address all 
resources/support needed to make the missile 
resource positioned appropriately or immediately 
taskable as applicable 
From ASIIS Candidate Measures, 2000 (document accompanying Lehmkuhl, 1999). 
 
 
Completed in 1999, the space values identified in this study depict the shift 
toward inclusion of “soft” values, which will need proxy attributes for measurement.  
The top two levels of AIM, along with the strategic objective, are shown below in 
Figure 7.  The full model is presented in Sub-appendix 3.
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Figure 19.  AIM Value Hierarchy (top two levels). 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
The more recent national security space value hierarchies display a trend toward 
values that represent qualities such as organization and planning that are not depicted in 
SPACECAST 2020 (1994).  This is somewhat expected, due to the original intent of 
that study, which was to evaluate systems and technologies.  The shift toward 
organization and planning objectives began with AFDD 2-2 (1998) and continued with 
the Aerospace Investment Model (1999), JP 3-14 (draft, 2001) and the Space 
Commission Report (2001).  Table1 4 depicts a comparison of the strategic objectives 
and first tier values of each of these studies. 
Table 14.  Comparison of Strategic Objectives and First Tier of Values for the 
Three Extracted Hierarchies and the Two Elicited Hierarchies. 
* Values that represent “soft” qualities for which the SPACECAST 2020 value model does not account. 
 Strategic 
Objective 
First Tier of Values 
Space support  
Space control 
Force enhancement 
SPACECAST 
2020, 1994 
(taken directly) 
Control and 
exploit space 
Force application 
Provide superior global situational awareness 
Operate freely in space 
Pursue space capabilities 
Induce effects on adversary 
AFDD 2-2, 
1998 
(extracted) 
Exploit space 
to provide 
integrated 
information 
superiority 
*Promulgate space advantages to national security 
community 
Inform 
Enable 
ASIIS, 1999 
(taken directly) 
Vigilance, 
Reach, and 
Power Act 
Provide space support to highest-level decision makers 
*Execute space development 
Reduce vulnerability 
Space 
Commission 
Report, 2001 
(extracted) 
Realize U.S. 
interests in 
space *Realign space thinking 
Provide responsive support to supported CINC 
*Organize for space operations 
Optimize space resource usage 
Draft JP 3-14, 
2001 
(extracted) 
Accomplish the 
nation’s military 
objectives 
*Articulate the contribution of space 
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This study finds that a sea change in space thinking has taken place over the last 
eight years, as measured by the differing values that have emerged from value models.  
Whereas SPACECAST 2020 using doctrine only as a starting point focused on directly 
measurable attributes, the value models for the AIM study and from the space doctrinal 
texts include concepts such as organization, integration, and command relationships.  It 
may be reasoned that this is not an unexpected result, given that the participants of 
SPACECAST 2020 were charged with producing a model with which to evaluate 
systems and concepts. This is precisely the point.  What has changed is the direction set 
forth by decision makers, whether it be expressed through doctrine or directed studies 
such as SPACECAST 2020 and ASIIS.  The direction not only encompasses directly 
measurable operational capabilities, but has expanded to include measurement of 
organization and planning not as easily measured.  These are concepts that will require 
proxy attributes to be constructed.  For example, “Rating of completeness of 
information by key operators in the command and control chain,” (AIM: Inform —
Command and Control — Maintain Common Operational Picture) will require a proxy 
attribute to be constructed to define “key operators” and “completeness of 
information.”  
An additional conclusion of this study was reached.  In addition to measuring 
organizational aspects of national security space, doctrine now directs that the profile of 
space and what it can contribute to national security should be raised.  Each current 
doctrinal source directs the elevation of space and its contribution to national security to 
a prominent level of discussion within the national security community.  With the 
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importance given to articulating the contribution of space, doctrine now seeks to bring 
space to the high ground of national security planning. 
Recommendations  
Kloeber (1995) has constructed proxy attributes to measure concepts such as 
organizational agility (Kloeber, 1995:130-136) and combined arms (Kloeber 1995:147-
159), using time to publish orders and variance of the number of different types of 
battlefield operating systems as primary inputs.  An examination of these attributes may 
lend insight to attributes that measure national security space organizational values.  
Further study in this area is recommended for filling out the remainder of the 
hierarchies. 
As mentioned above, repeating this analysis by using different human coders is 
recommended to validate the methodology used in this analysis.  A convergence of 
values from different analysts would indicate that the methodology is sound, while 
divergence would indicate that the methodology should be revisited.  Content analysis 
software, although less capable than humans of discerning meaning from context, offers 
a means to ensure the same assumptions are made throughout an analysis such as this 
one. Further analysis is recommended in these areas. 
A consideration that cannot be overlooked is that, although the Air Force has 
been named the DOD’s executive agent for space, the other services have an interest in 
national security space to support their missions as well.  Similar analysis of Army and 
Navy space doctrine is invited and recommended to determine if they value 
organizational concepts in a manner similar to the doctrine reviewed in this study. 
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Finally, doctrine is in a constant state of evolution.  The 2001 edition of AFDD 
2-2, Space Operations, has been recently made available, and a preliminary 
examination revealed 738 objective phrases in it.  Analysis using the method outlined 
in this study is necessary to provide a complete assessment of the how deep the “sea 
change” in national security space thinking has been.
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Sub-Appendix 1.  Value Model from the SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis.  
Presented in tabular form.  The first three columns represent the three tiers of the 
hierarchy, with attributes (measures of merit)  for the base level of the hierarchy in the 
sixth column.  The complete study, with alternate future scenarios with varied weights 
and alternatives scored is available at  
http://www.au.af.mil/Spacecast/monographs/ops-anal.doc 
 
SPACECAST 2020 VALUE MODEL 27 
May 
94 
      
          
Hierarchy with weights (Spacecast 2020 
"Standard World"): 
      
    Line  Current Minor Significant Order of  
OVERALL OBJECTIVE:  Control and 
Exploit Space 
 Item  Level Improvement Improvement Magnitude 
    No. Measure of 
Merit 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.5) (0.9) 
  Crisis 
availability 
0.35 1 Initial # links in 
theater 
about 10 25 100 1000's 
 Communications Capacity 0.35 2 Decompressed 
MB/sec 
300 
Mbits/sec/link 
600 1000 3000 
 0.22 Interoperability 0.20 3 Common-use 
systems 
Little All AF systems All US 
 systems 
US, 
commercial, 
intl. 
  Security 0.10 4 Level of 
secure links 
Corps Division Battalion Platoon 
  Availability 0.10 5 Crisis 
Availability 
Very good 100% -- -- 
 Navigation & Data 
availability 
0.25 6 Receiver 
size/cost 
Handheld/$1000 Handheld/$100 Wristwatch/ 
$50 
On one chip
Force Positioning Accuracy 0.25 7 Location 
precision 
10 m 1 m 1 cm -- 
Enhance- 0.20 Robustness 0.40 8 Resistance to 
CM 
None (common 
user) 
Antijam Antijam, 
 antispoof 
AJ, AS, 
antivirus 
ment  Processing 
Speed 
0.36 9 Auto image 
processing 
Some change 
det. 
Search, recognition Humans for 
review only 
Full auto 
report to 
user 
 Intelligence &   10 (not used)     
0.37 Surveillance ID Capability 0.21 11 Image 
interpretability
(classified) (classified) (classified) (classified) 
 0.25 Coverage 0.14 12 Area per unit 
time 
(classified) (classified) (classified) (classified) 
  Day-night, All 
Weather 
0.29 13 % time data 
available 
(classified) (classified) (classified) (classified) 
    14 (not used)     
 Environmental Spectral 
Bands 
0.20 15 Multispectral 
bands 
5 10 100's 1000's 
 Monitoring and Weather 
Prediction 
0.20 16 Prediction 24 hrs 3 day 1 week 1 month 
 Control Multispectral 
Coverage 
0.20 17 Multispectral 
revisit time 
7 days 5 days 1 day Hours 
  Weather 
Detail 
0.20 18 Instant WX 
info 
Cloud cover Clouds+precipitation Clds+precip+ 
winds 
-- 
 0.07 Weather 
Control 
0.20 19 Amount of 
control 
-- Clear fog Modify 
patterns 
Weather on 
demand 
 Mapping,   20 (not used)     
 Charting, & Surface 
Characterizatn 
0.31 21 Amount of 
detail 
Surface terrain Trafficability All structures Full resource 
characteriztn
 Geodesy Mensuration 0.31 22 Geodetic 
precision 
(classified) (classified) (classified) (classified) 
 0.08 Data 
availability 
0.38 23 Time to get 
new map 
Months 1 month 1 week 1 day 
  Coverage 0.20 24 Coverage Ltd global ICBM Ltd global MRBM Global 
MRBM 
Global 
SRBM/cruise
 Warning, ID Capability 0.30 25 What and 
where 
(classified) (classified) (classified) Missile type 
and target 
 Processing, & Timeliness 0.40 26 Time to tactical 
warning 
10 min 5-10 min 1 min Seconds 
 Dissemination Security 0.10 27 Resistance to 
CM 
None Antijam Antijam, 
antispoof 
AJ, AS, 
antivirus 
 0.18         
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Sub-Appendix 1 (continued). Value Model from the SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis.   
 
SPACECAST 2020 VALUE 
MODEL (Part 2) 
  Current Minor Significant Order of  
     Level Improvement Improvement Magnitude 
     Measure of Merit (0.0) (0.1) (0.5) (0.9) 
  Acquisition & 
Tracking 
Coverage ## 28 Covered area -- Most of Eurasia Half of globe World 
  0.25 Accuracy ## 29 Track accuracy -- 3 m in atmos. 3 m 
everywhere 
1 m 
everywhere 
   Discrimination ## 30 ID/Discrimination -- Warning of 
RV/decoy 
Limited 
discrimination 
Mid-course 
discrimination
 Ballistic Survivability 0.13  31 Qualitative 
judgment 
-- No 1-point Some capacity Full capacity 
 Missile       failures concerted 
attack 
major power 
attack 
 Defense Kill lethality 0.23  32 Pk -- 0.7 
endoatmospheric
0.7 endo & 
boost 
> 0.7 all 
phases 
  Timeliness 0.14  33 Required warning 
time 
-- 10 days Hours Seconds 
Force  Coverage 0.14  34 Defended area -- -- Regional Global 
Application 0.37 Capacity 0.12  35 RVs handled at a 
time 
-- A few 100 Entire enemy 
force 
0.19  Acquisition & 
Tracking 
Coverage ## 36 Covered area -- Most of Eurasia Half of globe World 
  0.20 Accuracy ## 37 Accuracy -- 3 m, unmoving 
tgt 
3 m, large 
moving tgt 
1 m, ground or 
air tgt 
 Air, Land, 
& Sea 
 Discrimination ## 38 ID/Discrimination -- ID ground targets Discr. mobile 
ground 
Discr. 
ground/air 
decoys 
 Defense 
from 
Survivability 0.17  39 Qualitative 
judgment 
-- No 1-point Some capacity Full capacity 
 Space       failures concerted 
attack 
major power 
attack 
  Kill lethality 0.13  40 Pk -- 0.9, fixed targets 0.5, armored 
vehicles 
0.9, ground/air 
tgts 
 0.27 Timeliness 0.23  41 Required warning 
time 
-- Weeks Days Minutes 
  Coverage 0.27  42 Covered area -- -- Regional Global 
  Acquisition & 
Tracking 
Coverage ## 43 Covered area -- Most of Eurasia Half of globe World 
  0.30 Accuracy ## 44 Accuracy -- 3 m, unmoving 
tgt 
3 m, large 
moving tgt 
1 m, ground or 
air tgt 
 Power  Discrimination ## 45 ID/Discrimination -- ID ground targets Discr. mobile 
ground 
Discr. 
ground/air 
decoys 
 Projection Survivability 0.13  46 Qualitative 
judgment 
-- No 1-point Some capacity Full capacity 
        failures concerted 
attack 
major power 
attack 
 0.37 Kill lethality 0.17  47 Pk -- 0.9, fixed targets 0.5, armored 
vehicles 
0.9, ground/air 
tgts 
  Timeliness 0.22  48 Required warning 
time 
-- 10 days Hours Seconds 
  Coverage 0.18  49 Covered area -- -- Regional Global 
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Sub-Appendix 1 (continued). Value Model from the SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis.   
 
SPACECAST 2020 VALUE MODEL 
(Part 3) 
  Current Minor Significant Order of  
     Level Improvement Improvement Magnitude 
     Measure of Merit (0.0) (0.1) (0.5) (0.9) 
 Surveillance Availability Coverage ## 50 Percent of space 90% Earth 
orbits 
All Earth 
orbits 
Cislunar 
space 
Heliocentric 
orbits 
  0.33 Revisit Time ## 51 Time to view 10s of hrs 1-6 hrs 10-60 min < 1 min 
  Robustness Survivability ## 52 Qualitative 
judgment 
Single-
point 
No 1-point Some 
capacity 
Full capacity 
      failures failures concerted 
attack 
major power 
attack 
 0.33 0.33 Maintainability ## 53 Time to restore Months + Days Hours Seconds 
  Accuracy Resolution ## 54 Target sample 
distance 
(classified) 1 m 10 cm 1cm 
Space  0.33 Identification ## 55 Percent objects 
ID'd 
(classified) (classified) 85% 100% 
Control   Track/Predict ## 56 Avg # objects 
lost 
500 100 10 0 
0.22 Protection Active Maneuver ## 57 Response time Hours 1 hour Minutes Seconds 
     Delta Velocity m/sec 10 m/sec 100 m/sec km/sec 
  0.40 Jamming ## 58 Spectral range Selected 
bands 
Double # 
bands 
All major 
bands 
All RFs 
   Decoys ## 59 Avg decoys / 
S/C 
0 0.5 1 10 
     Range of 
effectiveness 
-- VIS VIS+IR VIS+IR+Radar
 0.33  Defensive Fire 0.10 60 Pk -- 0.1 0.2 0.7 
  Passive Redundancy ## 61 Qualitative 
judgment 
Single-
point 
No 1-point Some 
capacity 
Full capacity 
      failures failures concerted 
attack 
major power 
attack 
  0.60 CC&D ## 62 Pd  1 0.8 0.5 0.2 
   Hardening ## 63 Sure safe W on 
target 
1 W 10 W 100 W 1 MW 
   Crypto 
Security 
0.10 64 Percent S/C with 
crypto 
90% 100% -- -- 
 Negation Target Acq  65 Time to produce 
state 
Hours-days 2 hours 90 min Minutes 
  0.20   vector after 
launch 
    
  Destructive Coverage ## 66 Percent of S/C -- 10% 20% 70% 
 0.33 ASAT Weapon 
Capacity 
## 67 Avg # shots / 
target 
-- 0.1 1 10 
  0.20 Effectiveness ## 68 Pk / shot -- 0.1 0.2 0.7 
  Incapacitating Coverage ## 69 Percent of 
systems 
-- 10% 20% 70% 
  Systems Effectiveness ## 70 Pr{incapacitate} -- 0.1 0.2 0.7 
  0.60        
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Sub-Appendix 1 (continued). Value Model from the SPACECAST 2020 Operational Analysis.   
 
SPACECAST 2020 VALUE  
MODEL (Part 4) 
   Current Minor Significant Order of  
      Level Improvement Improvement Magnitude 
     Measure of Merit (0.0) (0.1) (0.5) (0.9) 
  Cost Recurring ## 71 Cost/lb to orbit $6,500  $5,000  $2,000/lb $200/lb 
 Launch/ 
Lift 
0.25 Non-recurring ## 72 Develop/procure 
cost 
$10B $5B $2B $300M 
 0.62 Responsiven
ess 
Timeliness 0.17 73 Required 
warning time 
Months Weeks Days Hours 
  0.20 Orbit range 0.17 74 Inclinations 
achievable 
30% 40% 70% 90% 
   Surge 
capability 
0.17 75 Increase in rate 1 x 2 x 5 x 10 x 
   Mission range 0.17 76 Missions 
supported 
1 2 Several All current 
   Non-destruct 
 abort 
0.17 77 Pr{soft 
abort|abort} 
0 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Space   Post-abort 
 restart 
0.17 78 Time to restart 
ops 
Years Months Weeks Days 
Sup-
port 
 Reliability 0.15 79 Pr{destructive 
abort} 
5% 2-3% 1% 0.50% 
0.22  Operability Locations ## 80 # locations/orbit 
plane 
1 2 5 10 
  0.15 Fuel ## 81 Ease of handling Cryogenic/
toxic 
Part non-
cryo/toxic 
Mostly non-
cryo/toxic 
All non-
cryo/toxic 
   Ease of 
handling 
## 82 Percent blue-suit 0% 10% 50% 90% 
   Launch 
ranges 
## 83 Number and 
location 
One 
coastal 
site 
-- Many coastal 
 sites 
All CONUS 
   Cmd & 
Control 
## 84 Similarity to air 
ops 
Current 
launch ops
Like 
Pegasus/ 
Taurus 
Further 
simplification 
Like current 
 air ops 
  Environmenta
l 
 impacts 
0.10 85 Toxicity and 
waste 
High and 
much 
Mostly  
dirty 
Mostly clean Clean, low  
waste 
  Survivability 0.10 86 Type bases Fixed/soft Dispersed Mobile/very  
dispersed 
many 
/hardened/ 
mobile 
  Payload 0.05 87 Max lift/launch 50K 100K 200K -- 
 Satellite Communicati
ons 
0.33 88 Link reliability 99.999% -- 99.9999% 99.99999% 
 Control Diagnosis 0.33 89 Avg time to 
diagnose 
Hours 90 min 20 min 2 min 
 0.20 Survivability 0.33 90 Type ground 
stations 
Soft, 
worldwide
US territory Mobile 
 backups 
Mainly mobile 
  Sustainability S/C--
adaptability 
0.13 91 HW failure 
recovery 
Redund-
ancy only 
Ltd. 
Reconfigure-
ability 
Major 
reconfigure-
ability 
Only minor 
 mission losses 
 Logistic
s of 
0.40 S/C--
upgradability 
0.13 92 Design 
provisions 
None Limited Major Mission changes
 via S/W 
 System  Grd--
maintenance 
0.13 93 Level of repairs 
rqd 
Compon-
ent 
Board LRU S/W only 
 0.18  Grd--maint. 
freq. 
0.13 94 Frequency of 
actions 
Daily Monthly Many months Years 
   Grd--maint. 
skills 
0.13 95 Type of 
personnel 
Contract 
specialist 
Mix contract High-skilled 
 military 
5-level 
   Grd--parts 0.13 96 Type of piece 
parts rqd 
Specialize
d 
Mostly MIL-
SPEC 
MIL-SPEC Off the shelf 
   Grd--repair 0.13 97 % work value on 
site 
100% 75% 50% 10% 
   Grd--reliability 0.13 98 MTBF, critical 
parts 
100% of 
system life
125% of 
system life 
150% of  
system life 
200% of 
 system life 
  Commonality 0.20 99 S/C commonality System-
specific 
Modular 
subsystems 
Reconfigure 
designs 
Assemble at 
 launch site 
  Interoperabilit
y 
0.20 100 S/C 
Interchangeabilit
y 
None Alternates 
available 
Standard 
 interface 
S/C on any 
 launcher 
  Depots/ 
Infrastructure 
0.20 101 Dual-use 
technology 
Ltd use, 
compon-
ents 
Expand use Some dual-
use designs 
All systems  
dual-use 
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Sub-Appendix 2.  Aerospace Investment Model (AIM) Value Hierarchy tailored to 
AFSPC’s needs.  The shaded areas represent values that were not applicable to AFSPC 
and zeroed out. 
1.2.1 Process
1.2.2 Exploit
1.2.3 Report
1.3 Communicate
1.3.3 Video
1.3.2 Data Transfer
1.3.1 Telephony
1.3.4 Secure &
Survivable 
1.4 Command & Control
1.4.5 Develop
 Plans 
1.0  Inform
1.1.1.2 Signals 
1.1.4.2 Deep Space 
1.1.1 Air Events 
1.2 Interpret1.1 Sense 
1.1.4.1 Near Earth 
1.1.1.1 Objects 
1.1.4 Space Events 
1.1.2 Information  
Systems Events 
1.1.3 Missile Events 
1.1.3.2 Post-Boost 
Phase 
1.1.3.1 Boost Phase 
1.1.4.3 Signals 
1.1.5 Surface Events
1.1.5.5 Signals
1.1.5.4 NBC
1.1.5.2 Fixed 
 Targets 
1.1.5.1 Moving  
Targets 
1.1.5.3 Area  
Targets 
1.1.7 Terrestrial
Environmental Monitoring
Monitoring
1.1.6 Space Environmental
1.4.1 Maintain 
Common 
Operational Picture
1.4.2 Monitor 
Friendly Forces 
Status 
1.4.3 Monitor 
Enemy Forces 
Status 
1.4.4 Analyze/ 
 Predict 
1.4.6 Execute 
Plans 
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Sub-Appendix 2 (continued).  Aerospace Investment Model (AIM) Value Hierarchy, 
tailored to AFSPC’s needs.  The shaded areas represent values that were not applicable to 
AFSPC and zeroed out. 
 
2.0 Enable
2.4 Sustain2.3 Deploy2.2 Prepare 
2.4.1 Supply 
2.4.2 Maintain 
2.4.4 Reconstitute/  
Recover 
2.4.5 Provide Services 
2.4.3 Generate 
2.3.1 Assets 
Forward / to Theater
2.3.2 Assets to Space
2.3.1.1 Airlift
2.3.1.2 Support
Equipment
2.3.2.2 Contingency
Launch
2.3.2.3 Reposition
2.2.1 Test & Evaluate 
2.2.2 Train 
2.2.2.1 Air Operations
2 . 2 . 2 . 2 Space Operations
2.2.2.1.1 Aircrews
2.2.2.2.1 Missile 
    Operators 
2.2.2.2.2 Satellite 
     Operators 
2.2.2.2.3 Other 
2.3.2.1 Routine
      Launch
2.2.2.2 Support 
Personnel 
Space & Missile 
Operations Personnel
2.4.5.1 Airfield 
Operations 
2.4.5.3 Base 
Support 
2.4.5.2 
Medical 
2.4.5.4 Safety
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 Sub-Appendix 2 (continued).  Aerospace Investment Model (AIM) Value Hierarchy, 
tailored to AFSPC’s needs.  The shaded areas represent values that were not applicable to 
AFSPC and zeroed out. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Navigate
3.3.3.1 Aircrews
3.3.3 Rescue
3.3.3.2 Assets
 in Space 
3.2.3 Surface
3.2.2 Space
3.2.1 Airborne
3.3 Protect
3.0 Act
3.1 Mission Planning
3.3.1.1 Of Air Weapon 
Systems 
3.3.1.2 Of 
 Information Systems 
3.3.1.3 Of Space 
Weapon Systems 
3.3.1.4 Of Surface 
Weapon Systems 
3.1.1 Air Operations
3.1.2 Satellite &
Launch Operations
3.1.3 Missile
Operations
3.3.2 Escape
3.3.1 Survival
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Appendix C.  The Measures and Single-Dimension Value Functions. 
General Notes 
 
 The values, measures, and single-dimension value functions (SDVFs) were 
elicited from a set of 9 combat aircrew members representing three services.  Four 
structured discussions were held, interspersed with informal individual interviews.  
Platforms represented were B-52, F-15C, F-15E, F/A-18, F-14, EA-6B, and CH-46.  
Additional expertise was provided through electronic correspondence with USAF 
Weapons School instructors, representing F-15C, B-52, HH-60, and space operations 
perspectives.   
The term subject matter expert (SME) is used below to represent a member of the 
discussion while Weapons School experts are identified directly.  The term air warrior is 
used to represent all combat aircrews collectively.   
Below is a brief commentary of how the scales and SDVFs were elicited, 
followed by the measures and SDVFs. 
 
Span 
 
 Span of communication was found to be poorly represented by continuous 
numerical scales.  Additional distance does not represent additional value to the air 
warrior, and in some cases it represents less.  The ability to communicate across 
categories of operating locations — area of responsibility (AOR) (the example given was 
southern Iraq), unified command (the example given was USCENTCOM), hemisphere, 
and the globe — are considered more accurate discriminants of value.  The air warriors 
deem hemispherical and global span of communications to be relevant for measuring 
reach-back support communication to CONUS locations, and that the AOR and unified 
command categories were appropriate for measuring coordination in a joint warfighting 
environment. 
Bandwidth was used as a proxy to represent the volume of information.  Although 
bandwidth does not account for modulation and other schemes of compressing 
information into a signal, it served as a jumping-off point from which an idea of how 
much improvement over current capability is desired.  The scales for bandwidth are thus 
expressed as improvement over current capability (e.g., 0 = no improvement over current, 
1 = 100% improvement).  Although it could be argued that bandwidth would more 
logically fall under a value such as capacity or volume, the SMEs addressed this and 
agreed that bandwidth is a constituent of what they termed span of communications. 
A common refrain in the discussions over bandwidth was that it feeds its own 
desire.  “If you give me more I will want more” was the common sentiment, from both 
the SMEs in the facilitated discussions and the experts at the Weapons School.  This was 
particularly true with respect to data communications, especially imagery.  One of the 
examples brought forth by the SMEs was that an imaging capability of 30 frames per 
second would make the air warrior want 80 frames per second.  To represent the 
insatiable demand for data, a logarithmic scale was selected with a factor of 1000 times 
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the current capability as the upper extreme.  The SDVF selected was increasing 
exponential, and this was validated by the Weapons School experts. 
 
 
 
 
Reliability 
 
Reliability was found to be a critical measure.  The SMEs noted that the lack of 
reliable communication would negate other values represented in the hierarchy.  
Reliability was defined as the expected time available (uptime) during a particular phase 
(pre-flight or in-flight), expressed as a percentage of that phase.  Thresholds of reliability 
were established at the base level of the communication branch.  The SMEs decided that 
less than 75% communication reliability in the pre-flight planning timeframe would 
negate the value accorded to it under span.  They set a similar threshold for in-flight 
communication at 90%. 
Reliability was also identified as a measure of navigation.  The SMEs determined 
that it was less important in the pre-flight phase and set the maximum of the scale at 50%.  
The minimum of the in-flight scale, however, was set at 90% reflecting the importance of 
recency of update.  There were no negating thresholds identified for navigation. 
 
Positioning and Timing Error 
 
Horizontal error and altitude error as measured from true latitude, longitude, and 
altitude above sea level constitute what the air warrior values in positioning.  Although 
navigation error is commonly measured in meters by the space community, the SMEs 
thought that feet would be a more familiar unit for air warriors.  The SDVF that 
represents in-flight horizontal error stands out as the only piecewise linear SDVF in the 
model, representing a “sweet spot” in the middle where value decreases rapidly as error 
increases, beginning at 50 ft.   
Decreases in timing error, as measured by difference from true “Zulu” time, were 
found to have greater value in the pre-flight phase than in in-flight.  The SDVFs for each 
were decreasing inverse exponential and decreasing linear, respectively, which reflect a 
greater “payoff” on minimizing error before takeoff.   
 
Timeliness 
 Navigation timeliness is defined as the delay from update request to update 
receipt.  The air warrior is not concerned about navigation update delay before takeoff, 
but highly values rapid updates while in the air.  On a decreasing inverse exponential 
scale of 0 to 60 seconds, a value of 0.5 is reached at approximately 5 seconds, less than a 
twelfth of the distance to the minimum value. 
 
Denial Measures 
 
 The SMEs valued any space capability that could deny an adversary military 
capabilities of his own.  Without specific alternatives available to constrain their thinking, 
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this was the most value-focused part of the model.  Information denial and threat 
destruction comprise the first-tier value of denial, with information denial consisting of 
the other two values found in the first tier, with almost the same structure.  The rationale 
behind this symmetry was that “they’re humans, too, and they care about the same things 
we do.”  Omitted from the deny navigation values were positioning, timing, and 
timeliness, with a large premium placed on denying an adversary the reliability of his 
navigation.  The abstractness of thinking like the adversary made it difficult for the SMEs 
to specify details such as value-eliminating thresholds, and there were none identified. 
 The capability to disable a threat to friendly aircraft was identified as threat 
destruction, and categorical measures were the best fit.  The bomber and fighter pilots’ 
points of view on scaling the threat diverged, but consensus was reached.  The threats to 
friendly aircraft, in increasing order, were listed as Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), tactical 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), strategic SAMs, and airborne aircraft.   
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Communication 
Communication — Pre-flight — Voice — Span: Area of Coverage 
Measure: The area of coverage of a space-enabled voice communication system during 
pre-flight planning. 
Scale: categorical   Units: Categories of coverage 
Direction: decreasing  SDVF:  discrete  
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Communication — Pre-flight — Voice — Span: Bandwidth (proxy for information 
volume) 
Measure: The bandwidth of a space-enabled voice communication system during pre-
flight planning. 
Scale: 0 to 6    Units: factor of improvement over current capability 
Direction: increasing  SDVF:  exponential, ρ = 4.062 
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Communication — Pre-flight — Voice — Reliability 
Measure: The % of pre-flight planning time space-enabled voice communication is 
available. 
Scale: 75% to 100%   Units: % 
Direction: increasing  SDVF:  exponential, ρ = 30.4 
 
 
 
 
Communication — In-flight — Voice — Span: Area of Coverage 
Measure: The area of coverage of a space-enabled voice communication system during 
in-flight execution. 
Scale: categorical   Units: Categories of coverage 
Direction: decreasing  SDVF:  discrete  
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Communication — In-flight — Voice — Span: Bandwidth (proxy for information 
volume) 
Measure: The bandwidth of a space-enabled voice communication system during in-flight 
execution, as expressed by improvement over current capability.   
Scale: 0 to 6    Units: factor of improvement over current capability 
Direction: increasing  SDVF:  linear, slope = 1/6 
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Communication — In-flight — Voice — Reliability 
Measure: The % of in-flight execution time space-enabled voice communication is 
available. 
Scale: 90 to 100   Units: % 
Direction: increasing  SDVF:  exponential, ρ = -5.55 
 
0.0000
0.1000
0.2000
0.3000
0.4000
0.5000
0.6000
0.7000
0.8000
0.9000
1.0000
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100
Uptime (%)
Va
lu
e
 
 
 
   119
Communication — Pre-flight — Data — Span: Area of Coverage (local weight 0.4) 
Measure: The area of coverage of a space-enabled data communication system during 
pre-flight planning. 
Scale: categorical   Units: Categories of coverage 
Direction: increasing  SDVF:  discrete  
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Communication — Pre-flight — Data — Span: Bandwidth (proxy for information 
volume, local weight 0.6) 
Measure: The bandwidth of a space-enabled data communication system during pre-flight 
planning, as expressed by improvement over current capability.   
Scale: 0 to 1000, logarithmic Units: factor of current capability 
Direction: increasing  SDVF:  exponential, ρ = 144 
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Communication — Pre-flight — Data — Reliability 
Measure: The % of pre-flight planning time space-enabled data communication is 
available. 
Scale: 75% to 100%   Units: % 
Direction: increasing  SDVF:  linear, slope = 1/25  
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Communication — In-flight — Data — Span: Area of Coverage (local weight 0.4) 
Measure: The area of coverage of a space-enabled data communication system during in-
flight execution. 
Scale: Binary   Units: Categories of coverage 
Direction: increasing  SDVF:  binary discrete  
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Communication — In-flight — Data — Span: Bandwidth (proxy for information 
volume, local weight 0.6)  
Measure: The bandwidth of a space-enabled data communication system during pre-flight 
planning, as expressed by improvement over current capability.   
Scale: 0 to 1000, logarithmic Units: factor of current capability 
Direction: increasing  SDVF:  exponential, ρ = 144 
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Communication — In-flight — Data — Reliability 
Measure: The % of in-flight execution time space-enabled data communication is 
available. 
Scale: 90% to 100%   Units: % 
Direction: increasing  SDVF:  linear, slope = 10 
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Navigation 
 
Navigation — Pre-flight — Positioning: Horizontal Error (local weight 0.4) 
Measure: The error from true horizontal position of the space-based navigation signal in 
the Pre-flight planning phase of an air operation. 
Scale: 0 to 100   Units: ft 
Direction: decreasing  SDVF:  exponential, ρ = -41 
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Navigation — Pre-flight — Positioning: Altitude Error (local weight 0.6) 
Measure: The error from true altitude position of the space-based navigation signal in the 
Pre-flight planning phase of an air operation. 
Scale: 0 to 250   Units: ft 
Direction: decreasing  SDVF: exponential, ρ = 76.25 
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Navigation — Pre-flight — Timing: 
Measure: The error from true time of the space-based navigation signal in the Pre-Flight 
planning phase of an air operation. 
Scale: 0 to 0.1   Units: sec 
Direction: decreasing  SDVF: ρ = -0.0144 
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Navigation — Pre-flight — Reliability: Uptime 
Measure: The percentage of time that navigation data is available in the pre-flight 
planning portion of an operation. 
Scale: 0% to 50%    Units: % 
Direction: increasing   SDVF: linear, slope = 50 
 
0.0000
0.1000
0.2000
0.3000
0.4000
0.5000
0.6000
0.7000
0.8000
0.9000
1.0000
0 10 20 30 40 50
Uptime (%)
Va
lu
e
 
   124
Navigation — In-flight — Positioning: Horizontal Error (local weight 0.4) 
Measure: The error from true horizontal position of the space-based navigation signal in 
the In-Flight phase of an air operation. 
Scale: 0 to 100  Units: ft  
Direction: decreasing  SDVF: Piecewise Linear 
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Navigation — In-flight — Positioning: Altitude Error (local weight 0.6) 
Measure: The error from true altitude position of the space-based navigation signal in the 
In-Flight phase of an air operation. 
Scale: 0 to 250  Units: ft 
Direction: decreasing   SDVF: exponential, ρ = 76.25 
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Navigation — In-flight — Timing: 
Measure: The error from true time of the space-based navigation signal in the In-Flight 
phase of an air operation. 
Scale: 0 to 0.1   Units: sec 
Direction: decreasing  SDVF: xxv 101)( −=  
 
0.0000
0.1000
0.2000
0.3000
0.4000
0.5000
0.6000
0.7000
0.8000
0.9000
1.0000
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
Timing Error (sec)
Va
lu
e
 
 
Navigation — In-flight — Reliability 
Measure: The percentage of time that navigation data is available in the In-flight phase of 
an operation. 
Scale: 90% to 100%   Units: % 
Direction: increasing  SDVF: exponential, ρ = 3.05 
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Navigation — In-flight — Timeliness 
Measure: The delay between request for navigation system update and receipt in the In-
flight phase of an operation. 
Scale: 0 to 60   Units: sec 
Direction: decreasing   SDVF: exponential, ρ = -6.9 
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Denial 
 
Denial — Information Denial — Communication 
This value is structured identically to Communication in the first tier, except that the 
value is placed on a space-based capability to deny an adversary the Communication 
that was valued in the first tier.  The same measures and SDVFs apply, but no value 
preservation thresholds were identified.   
 
Denial — Information Denial — Navigation 
This value is divided into pre-flight and in-flight components in the same manner as 
Navigation in the first tier.  The SMEs identified Reliability as the center of gravity for 
both the pre-flight and in-flight components, and did not consider an adversary’s 
Navigation Positioning, Navigation Timing, or Navigation Timeliness worthy of 
denial.   
 
Denial — Threat Removal 
Measure: The capability to disable a threat to friendly aircraft. 
Scale: categorical   Units: Categories of threat 
Direction: increasing   SDVF: discrete 
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